

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1983-12

Change in Nigeria: challenge of the 80's

Gilkes, George H.

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/19664>

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.


Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

DUBOIS, J. B.
N. 100
MCALLISTER, CALIFORNIA 93943

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

CHANGE IN NIGERIA:
CHALLENGE OF THE 80's

by

George H. Gilkes

December 1983

Thesis Advisor:

Michael Clough

Approved for Public Release,
Distribution Unlimited

T215177

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Change in Nigeria: Challenge of the 80's		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis December 1983
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) George H. Gilkes		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		12. REPORT DATE December 1983
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 156
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Change in Nigeria Nigeria's Future Islam in Nigeria Ethnicity in Nigeria Economics in Nigeria		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Nigeria, a country of great importance to US interests, faces many challenges in the 1980's. The survival of this strategically important nation may be dependent upon its ability to manage and control the forces currently at work trying to dismember the growing unity of its people. Three potential forces for change - Islam, ethnicity, and the economy - are discussed and the most likely vehicle for peaceful, progressive change, is analyzed. While facing its many challenges the emergence of a constitutional government, steadily gaining in strength, may provide Nigeria's best hope.		

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Change in Nigeria:
Challenge of the 80's

by

George H. Gilkes
Captain, United States Army
B.A., Florida State University, 1974

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1983

ABSTRACT

Nigeria, a country of great importance to US interests, faces many challenges in the 1980's. The survival of this strategically important nation may be dependent upon its ability to manage and control the forces currently at work trying to dismember the growing unity of its people. Three potential forces for change - Islam, ethnicity, and the economy - are discussed and the most likely vehicle for peaceful, progressive change, is analyzed.

While facing its many challenges the emergence of a constitutional government, steadily gaining in strength, may provide Nigeria's best hope for peaceful evolution and significant development in the 1980's.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	U.S. CONCERNS IN NIGERIA	6
	A. THE ECONOMY	6
	B. NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, AND FOREIGN POLICY	9
	1. The Military	11
	2. The Conduct of Nigeria's International Relations	11
II.	THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE	15
	A. COLONIAL NIGERIA	15
	1. The Application of Indirect rule in Nigeria	16
	2. Amalgamation	19
	3. Nationalism and Constitutional Evolution	24
	4. Independence	36
	B. CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN POST-INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA	39
	1. The Conflict Begins	42
	2. Civil War	47
	C. POST CIVIL WAR POLITICS	48
	1. The New Nigerian Constitutional System	49
	2. The 1979 Elections - A New Beginning	52
	D. THE 80'S - CONTINUITY OR CHANGE	56
III.	ISLAMIC VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA-FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE 80'S	58
	A. THE KANO RIOT	58
	B. THE 1981 AND 1982 RIOTS	62

C.	THE HISTORY OF ISLAM IN NIGERIA	65
1.	A Pocket Guide to Islam	66
2.	Islam in West Africa: 10th - 15th Century	67
3.	Islam in West Africa: 15th - 17th Century	73
4.	Islam in West Africa: 17th - 18th Century	75
5.	Islam in West Africa: 19th Century Reform and Change	77
6.	Summary	83
D.	COLONIAL NIGERIA	83
E.	WHAT IS FUNDAMENTALISM IN NIGERIA TODAY . . .	85
1.	Nigerian Fundamentalism-The Players . . .	86
IV.	ETHNICITY AND CHANGE	89
V.	THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY	94
A.	OIL AND THE FOURTH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN	96
B.	TRADE	111
C.	PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS .	112
D.	FUTURE PROSPECTS	114
VI.	CONCLUSION	116
A.	ISLAM	117
1.	Revivalism - A Course for Change	117
B.	ETHNICITY AND CHANGE	128
C.	ECONOMICS AND CHANGE	131
D.	FINALLY	132
	NOTES	134
	APPENDIX A:	141
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	155

I. U.S. CONCERNS IN NIGERIA

Demographically, Nigeria is one of the largest countries in sub-Sahara Africa with the largest population, estimated at between 80 and 100 million people. By virtue of the discovery of large, high quality, crude oil deposits and the evolution of a relatively stable government Nigeria has gained some pre-eminence within African politics and has displayed an ability to control, in some degree, her own developmental processes.

It is because of Nigeria's size, oil, government and relative stability that the US has become concerned with Her growth and has displayed an interest in the areas of economic and, specifically, oil development and the progress of Nigeria's governmental processes (to include the Nigerian military and Nigeria's conduct of foreign politics).

A. THE ECONOMY

Economics and trade provide the foundation for current U.S./Nigerian relations. This relationship is centered, primarily, on Nigeria's crude oil deposits. The US is the major foreign market for Nigeria's oil and Nigeria ranks second only to Saudi Arabia as the most important supplier of petroleum to the US. Nigeria provides, approximately, 15 percent of total US oil consumption and US oil imports represent 46 percent of Nigeria's exports (with no alternative market in the near future). This interdependence has fostered some misunderstandings in US/Nigerian relationships. Four of the most critical misunderstandings follow and provide the parameters around which US policy toward Nigeria has been formulated.

1. The most serious misunderstanding centers around how far Nigeria will go in using its oil as a lever to pressure action on South Africa. Nigeria's leverage is tied directly to its oil exports, however, this leverage has rapidly waned in conjunction with the current oil glut and Nigeria's recurring developmental crises. The US, while tending to overstate its relative advantage towards Nigeria (by representing 46 percent of her total exports) must also recognize Nigeria as an honest broker in African affairs and cultivate a policy which appreciates Nigeria's status while preserving US foreign policy goals.
2. A second misunderstanding concerns whether or not Nigeria is an oil rich nation with a talented population or a very poor nation with a large and growing population and rapidly dwindling non-renewable resources. The US view is that Nigeria is flush with oil and petro-dollars and should pay, in full, for whatever it wants from the US. Nigeria argues that it is a poor country, eligible for aid. However, as a member of OPEC, Nigeria is (by US law) ineligible for concessional as opposed to fully reimbursable assistance. While fully 90 percent of Nigerian exports are in petroleum products they must simultaneously import over \$2 billion of food stuffs annually. Attempts by Nigeria to rebuild its agricultural sector have failed in large part because the programs are tied to oil exports, an inherently unstable resource upon which to peg development. It appears that the US can expect schisms in relations with Nigeria if a policy of aid and assistance is not adopted. [1] Nigeria has demonstrated a sufficient ambiguity in East-West affairs and possesses the necessary political expediency to seek Eastern bloc assistance if that is all that remains available.

3. The rich vs poor misunderstanding is related to the huge US deficit in its trade with Nigeria. The US would like to see Nigeria rapidly increase its government and private sector purchases from the US while Nigeria prefers to buy and sell from all comers, while at the same time encouraging US firms to invest, particularly in agribusiness. Nigeria has surpassed Japan as the principal source of the overall US visible trade deficit. As a result of these growing economic ties a series of high-level bilateral talks, between the US and Nigeria, have been held since 1977. In September, 1981, Vice President George Bush hosted Vice President Ekwueme and the Nigerian delegation during the sixth session. "These bilateral meetings have provided opportunities to discuss closer cooperation in agriculture, energy, science and technology, health, trade and investment, and education and have resulted in some specific agreements." [2] As a part of an understanding on agricultural cooperation, the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, composed of public and private sector representatives, was established, in 1980, to promote private sector agricultural investment. A high level US trade mission led by Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige, and Secretary of Agriculture, John R. Block, visited Nigeria in early 1982. Comprising senior executives of about twenty five US corporations, the mission explored the possibilities for increased economic cooperation between the United States and Nigeria. One further example of growing economic ties between the US and Nigeria was the establishment, in 1982, of a US-Nigerian Business Council.

4. Finally, the US would like Nigeria to maintain high production rates of its quality crude and charge prices below OPEC minimums. Nigeria would like to do the opposite. Nigeria's price cuts in early 1983 did not represent an attempt by Nigeria to become an OPEC dissident, rather the cuts represented an attempt to survive a world oil glut, lower North Sea oil prices, and a general productivity cut that threatened to undermine the fabric of Nigeria's national economic structure. At the time of the cuts Nigeria was producing oil at a rate of less than 500,000 bpd. Most Nigerian government authorities concluded that a minimum of 1 million bpd needed to be produced just to meet the balance of payments schedule. Furthermore, Nigeria's oil production and price fixing is closely tied to two over-riding factors. 1) Nigerian crude oil is of the finest quality in the world (due to its low sulfur content) and costs from three to seven times more to extract than that of other OPEC countries. 2) Nigeria has pegged its Fourth National Development plan to petro-dollars based on oil production of 2.23 million bpd at \$36.00 per barrel. Nigeria's recent price cuts to \$30.00 per barrel, while increasing production to the required OPEC minimum of 1.3 million bpd, has severely dampened the optimistic outlook portrayed in the 1981-1985 Fourth Development Plan.

B. NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, AND FOREIGN POLICY

The 1979 Nigerian Constitution was brought into force by the Federal Military Government (FMG) as an ordinary decree, entitled the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (enactment) Decree of 1978, number 25, taking effect on 1

October, 1979. In a departure from its British forerunners the new constitution adopted features of the United States constitution - "The establishment of a governmental system predicated on a popularly elected president at the head of a strong executive branch and a separate bicameral legislature." [3]

Although, the Nigerian political framework bears a marked resemblance to the federal system of the United States, the institutions the republic has adopted carry the imprint of its own unique experiences and needs (See appendix A for governmental structure). The president is intentionally delegated strong executive powers and special conditions attached to his election are intended to insure that he will be more than a regional candidate, while his cabinet must, by constitutional direction, include ministers representing all nineteen states.

The 1979 elections represented the first test of Nigeria's new system and despite some vestiges of ethno-regional politics which had plagued Nigeria in the past they had to be termed a success. The next test of Nigeria's system took place in August 1983, when Nigerians voted for the second time in a national election. The inherent instability created by national elections in third world countries posed a serious threat to Nigerian unity particularly when compounded by economic difficulties and internal unrest sparked by dissident student groups and rival religious factions. The world anxiously awaited the outcome of this most critical test of Nigerian continuity. It now appears that the 1983 election was a complete success and, although marred by some political bitterness and factional infighting, can only serve to strengthen the democratic political process which continues to grow in Nigeria.

1. The Military

Militarily, Nigeria is without peer in west Africa and is generally recognized as a potentially dominant military force in sub-Sahara Africa. Although, not inclined to use its military, Nigerian forces have served with distinction on numerous United Nations peacekeeping forces and was instrumental in establishing the ill fated OAU peacekeeping force in Chad which failed in 1981. Certainly its size, population, and military strength mark Nigeria as an imposing regional force in west Africa.

Historically, Nigeria has taken a conciliatory and passive view of most foreign policy matters not involving Africa. Nigeria is keen for arbitration and compromise and not for armed conflict. However, that Nigeria is prepared to defend itself and its African allies is evidenced by its recent military expenditures program projected at \$6.4 billion through 1985, and its continuing efforts at force modernization and self sufficiency in technical training.

In January, 1981, Nigeria announced a five year development plan which included, "the modernization of its armed forces to make Nigeria's army the best in Africa and comparable to the best in the world." Of particular concern for Nigeria is Libya's aggression into Chad which occurred in both 1980 and 1983. Increased defense expenditures may also be seen by the country's rulers as politically advisable, "In as much as it might be expected to keep the soldiers contented, deflect rebellion, and enhance Nigeria's self-image and reputation as a major continental power." [4]

2. The Conduct of Nigeria's International Relations

Nigeria maintains an ambiguous strategic outlook by fostering relations with both the east and west. Since the civil war Nigeria has remained strongly non-aligned giving

no preferred status to US or Soviet interests. Sometimes considered a leftist oriented country, this misperception springs from the civil war when Nigeria was forced to buy weapons from the Soviets (after US and European sources failed to cooperate). The Soviets perceived this action as indication of closer ties. The Nigerian government saw it as strictly a cash deal with no implication of further commitment. This idea of cash deals and non-alliance has remained an integral part of Nigerian foreign policy and has increased as their ability to buy with petro-dollars has increased. Nigeria's unpredictability is a matter of policy, a deliberate posture designed to show both East and West that Nigerian friendship cannot be taken for granted. Thus, while condemning the Soviets for their invasion of Afghanistan they also attended the 1980 Olympics in defiance of the US boycott. This deliberate ambiguity has left neither of the two world powers sure of Nigeria's loyalty, cooperation, or hostility.

In October, 1979, Nigerian President Shagari addressed the UN General Assembly and reinforced the importance of Africa and Nigeria by saying, "The problems of no other continent define the international agenda better than those of Africa....The destiny of Nigeria is inextricably linked with the fortunes of all the countries of Africa." [5] This statement serves to illustrate Nigeria's feeling that within the international framework Africa is the most crucial actor and Nigeria is the most important actor within Africa.

Having stated the importance of Nigeria and Africa in the international arena Nigeria has not failed to recognize at least three other key international actors. First, the US, who is their number one oil customer. Second, the Soviet Union, because of their military strength and ability to project themselves into African states. Third, the EEC, due to close trade relations and historical ties.

Nigeria views the international distribution of power in a practical sense noting that the US and the USSR are the two nations most capable of interference in African development. To the western world and to Nigeria, oil is the single most important source of Nigerian leadership both within Africa and within the international community. Nigeria is a "Price Hawk" among OPEC nations (mostly due to her need to maintain oil production in the face of growing internal development problems, as was recently demonstrated by Nigeria's oil price reductions in the face of serious OPEC dissent) and has used oil as a linkage issue in the South African situation. Nigeria's willingness to use oil as a weapon to force concessions has been demonstrated on at least three occasions. 1) By expropriating British Oil in 1979. 2) When it withheld shipments to Ghana to protest the execution of former leaders. 3) When they stopped oil supplies to Chad to protest the failure of their peace keeping efforts prior to the intervention of Libya. It is clear that should the issue merit such action Nigeria is prepared to use oil as a political sanction. However, it is equally clear that Nigeria does not possess the capability to seriously threaten the oil flow to the US as it has threatened to do in the wake of the continuing problems stemming from South Africa's apartheid policy's and the US's failure to take a clear cut stance on that issue. Nigeria could not tolerate the loss of its largest customer and expect to survive economically. However, as a matter of policy the Nigerian government remains firmly committed to the struggle for the total liberation of the continent from the oppression of minority regimes.

In sum, Nigeria has taken a defensive international posture. Threatening to use oil as a weapon and clearly defining the cases in which that weapon might be invoked. Within the African continent Nigeria has assumed a role as

the "Giant" of Africa and has been instrumental in fostering African unity through its support of the OAU and similar organizations. It is certain that if Nigeria can overcome her internal instability and fully develop her economic resources she will emerge as one of the most powerful nations in Africa.

II. THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE

Nigeria's return to civilian rule, in 1979, launched an experiment in democratic politics which remains an object of keen observation by not only the US but also neighboring African states and socialist influenced governments worldwide.

While representing a strong and dedicated attempt to bring equal government to a highly pluralistic society the process of returning to civilian rule also created several potential sources of tension. The return to civilian rule marked the farthest point of an experiment which began with Britain's first colonial incursions and culminated in the 1979 elections.

A. COLONIAL NIGERIA

It is well beyond the scope of this paper to recount the entire period of Britain's colonial occupation of Nigeria, however, by reviewing selected historical episodes (to include the British policy of Indirect Rule, the Amalgamation Process of 1914, the rise of Nigerian nationalism constitutional evolution, and the impact of independence) a foundation is laid which illustrates the instability of the new governmental system now operating in Nigeria, a foundation based on regional biases, ethnic competition, and British insensitivity to the needs of a culturally diverse, politically divergent, and loosely confederated conglomeration of independent peoples.

1. The Application of Indirect rule in Nigeria

Sir Frederick Lugard, like other British conquerers, adopted a policy of ruling through the aristocracy of the conquered people. This system, known as 'Indirect Rule,' was never as indirect as is commonly represented. "It was indirect only as long as the traditional authority accepted the dictate of the colonial regime." [6] Recognized as an efficient and inexpensive way to govern conquered peoples Lugard managed to take the process of indirect rule beyond an expedient form of governorship (to overcome economic hardship and lack of staff) to a complete philosophy of government for Britain's colonial people. [7] Recognized as a cheap policy which produced order, peace, and tranquility, indirect rule created an air of isolation and cultural stagnation, in Northern Nigeria, which the British never fully realized.

A number of factors combined to isolate the caliphate from the great 20th century world movements. By the middle of the 19th century the trans-Saharan routes began to decline as a result of the trade contacts opened up on the Niger River. [8] The net effect of this activity (designed to open trade from the coast to the interior) combined with the subsequent decline in the trans-Saharan trade was; that when the Muslim world was beginning its modern transformation the Caliphate in northern Nigeria was beginning to lose contact with it. The establishment of the colonial boundaries [9] completed the process of isolation.

As a part of the policy of indirect rule, the British promised not to interfere with the Muslim religion. This was broadly interpreted by both parties to mean that Christian missionaries would not be encouraged to proselytize in northern Nigeria. This increased northern Nigeria's isolation by causing it to miss the opportunities afforded

by the missionary education system. The Yoruba and subsequently the Ibo populations quickly recognized the importance of western education so necessary to secure civil service jobs and compete in a western dominated economy. With few exceptions, the northern Nigerian education system was still based on the old Qur'anic schools which ill prepared its students for westernized and modernized society and virtually precluded education for women despite Uthman dan Fodio's reformist moves in this area. The cumulative effect of this isolation from the Christian missionary education system was a lack of trained personnel to manage northern businesses or work in northern civil service positions. As a result of this qualified manpower shortage a large southern population, comprised mainly of Ibo's, migrated north to secure jobs which were so scarce in the over populated eastern portions of Nigeria. Eventually, this migration and the subsequent establishment of large southern population centers, called sabon garis, colocated with northern cities (the largest was in Kano) was to have serious consequences which manifested themselves in the Nigerian Civil War.

The British never saw the problem this isolation of the north was creating for the day of eventual self-government. The main British concern seemed to be northern isolation from the possible violent impact of southern views and religion. However, the southern influx of trained personnel was perceived as a cheap way to staff an undermanned civil service, creating a dichotomy in British interests which they apparently failed to perceive. Thus, as the 20th century progressed, northern Nigeria became cut-off from the Maghreb and middle east, and protected from southern Nigerian ideas and movements. "The north presented a picture of tranquility strangely out of place in the general upheavals of the 20th century. [10]

Lugard's policy of indirect rule was narrowly perceived as a resounding success for British colonial administration. It was efficient, cheap, and peaceful. Based on the Fulani Emirs feudal control over the population the British were able to manipulate a vast area of Nigeria via their over-riding control of relatively few leaders; leaders who manifested intense loyalty to the British Empire in return for localized power.

The British policy of indirect rule in northern Nigeria provided a unique medium for the growth and spread of Islam. However, it laid the groundwork for serious social and political upheaval in the future. Among the most consequential problems were:

1. A socially and economically deprived northern state, isolated from the mainstream of Nigerian commerce.
2. A state unable to develop educationally at a rate commensurate with its neighbors to the south.
3. A groundwork for future ethno-religious conflicts as Christian Ibo's moved north to staff institutions which northern Muslims were not prepared to staff.
4. An air of unrest as potential Islamic reformers asserted that the traditional ruler's claim to power lacked validity because they had subverted the tenets and values of Islam to their own, frequently, corrupt purposes.

With the "success" of the policy of indirect rule in northern Nigeria the foundation was laid for the process of Amalgamation to begin. However, as will be emphasized, the amalgamation process was another form of economic expediency which had the net effect of exacerbating ethno-regional problems between north and south Nigeria.

2. Amalgamation

By 1900 the major areas of resistance to British authority had been overcome. Yorubaland was under treaty, Benin had been conquered, and the northern emirates were firmly entrenched in the British policy of indirect rule. Only Iboland remained fully outside of British colonial jurisdiction and in 1902 an expedition to assert British authority was launched. The success of the campaign was imminent and although some parts of Iboland were not brought under British control until 1918, "the year 1906, when the Lagos Protectorate was merged with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the north was finally pacified, can be taken as marking the beginning of effective British administration in modern Nigeria." [11] Up to this point, although Nigerian's had frequent contact with Europeans, there had been very little cultural exchange. The main British interest had been economic and there had been no conscious effort to alter society "except in so far as customs hindered trade." [12]

"The period 1906-1912, which preceded the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates, by Lugard, is one of the most crucial in the history of Nigeria, for it marks both the beginning of effective administration and the beginning of the rejection of standards and customs that had endured almost intact for many centuries." [13] For the first time, Nigerians were exposed in a large measure to western influences. A new economic world, Christianity, education, and new systems of administration and justice were all introduced. The western way of life was made available to a wide range of Nigerians. "So, although this period appears from the annual reports as a static one, it was in effect the beginning of silent revolution in Nigeria." [14]

These revolutionary forces of education, western commerce, Christianity, and administrative innovation were let loose between 1906 and 1912 thereby, setting the stage for Lugard, as Governor General of Nigeria, to mold the northern and southern protectorates into one amalgamated state. "The decisions he made in those years were to influence the canalization of these new forces until, after the second world war, when control was slowly taken over from the British administration by the Nigerian nationalists themselves." [15]

As previously mentioned, amalgamation was a direct result of economic expediency. The northern protectorate was running at a severe deficit. Funds were being transferred from the south to the north to finance various projects and the government itself. This practice fostered considerable enmity between north and south and came to a head over the issue of railway construction. Although all of the details are impossible to recount within the confines of this paper, suffice it to say that a railway was planned from Port Harcourt to the interior city of Kano. [16] It became clear to the British colonial government, that the most expeditious coordination could be achieved through the amalgamation of north and south. Basically, it was hoped that a single administration would be better equipped to disperse funds and that hostility evolving from the North's inability to pay for itself would be assuaged.

Amalgamation was achieved on 1 January, 1914. The northern and southern provinces of Nigeria together retained their status as a British protectorate while Lagos, the capital, remained a British colony. Thus, for the first time in history, a country called Nigeria was created.

The most profound aspect of the amalgamation policy was the continued separation of north and south. [17] Instead of having the two sets of societies interact, which

would have been fostered by full amalgamation, they were kept apart, thus continuing the isolation of the north from the impact of southern economic activity, educational progress, and (more dubiously) Christian influence. British rule in the north had already increased the tendency visible in the 19th century, of isolating Nigerian Muslims from the rest of Islam by stopping the trans-Saharan trade, and although the south could not be insulated from modernizing western influences because of its commercial position, Lugard was largely able to prevent these influences from flowing north. Therefore, under an amalgamated Nigeria, the peoples remained separate though nominally under the same government.

It was Lugard's belief that his system of indirect rule could be adapted and modified so that it would work anywhere. After the amalgamation of Nigeria he applied this theory to both the Yoruba and Ibo peoples, believing that he could find and train chiefs who could be made into the same type of feudal autocrats whom he had been accustomed to using in the north. A brief summary of the failure of this policy among the Yoruba and Ibo follows.

a. Indirect Rule in Yorubaland

In Yorubaland, the British wanted to return to the conditions of the 18th century and make Oyo the chief power. On the assumption that an oba in Yorubaland resembled an emir in the north, the British tried to govern by controlling the obas as they did the emirs. However, Obas in Yorubaland were not autocratic; rather they shared power with a number of chiefs and maintained their power only through the approval of these chiefs. When the British tried to insure that the chiefs selected were favorable to their policies they found that a complex system of lineages was involved. Subsequent attempts, by the British, to bribe and coerce the lineage groups produced confusion and resentment.

b. The Ibo and Indirect Rule

Just as the policy of indirect rule, imported from the north, was unsuited for Yorubaland so it was equally unsuited for the Ibo. The core of the Ibo system was the village assembly. A progressive British official might have been able to parlay this popular system into some form of British local government, but Lugard's notion prevailed. It was considered essential to discover traditional authorities among the Ibo.

Lugard sent an officer from the north, Lord Palmer, to make this discovery. Palmer identified the lineage elders as the local authority, despite the fact that the elder was usually no more than the spokesman for the village meeting. The elders were vested with an authority they had never before possessed. Eventually, these elders in a once popular system came to be viewed by the Ibo people as tyrants representing British rule. Resentment became anger and when discontent arose it was directed at these "warrant chiefs." [18]

Meanwhile, another social development was beginning to provide the Ibos with a means to express opposition to British policy. "Having been incorporated into an amalgamated Nigeria and influenced by the Yoruba western educated class, the Ibo used the co-operative strength of their clans to build schools, educate their promising sons and play one Christian mission off against the other to gain the greatest benefit." [19] Eventually, the Roman Catholics emerged as the most helpful missionary activity, thereby, securing a paramount position within Ibo society. In any case, educational development was the product of Ibo local organization, not of the British administration. "Their advances were largely brought about within 19th century social and political institutions and not within the system which the British were trying to impose." [20]

c. World War I

Much of Lugard's objective was undermined, in 1914, by the outbreak of war in Europe. The involvement of Nigeria in World War I could not be avoided, and this meant that many Africans were taken out of their traditional societies and thrust into service as soldiers for the Queen. The Nigerians became heavily involved in fighting the Germans in Cameroun. "Surprisingly, the war was not taken as an occasion to throw off the colonial yoke." [21] Significantly, there was an attempt by the Germans to foment a jihadist movement in northern Nigeria to embarrass the Anglo-French war effort. Relying on Turkey's alliance, the Germans felt that the Turks, as leaders of the Islamic world, would sway Nigerian Muslims to rebel. The attempt was a resounding failure as Nigerian Muslims remained staunchly loyal to their British overlords. The reason for this loyalty was not quite clear but probably lay with the reticence of northern emirs to abdicate the positions which they held at the disgression of British administrative policy.

Perhaps more significantly, for the first time, the Nigerian people had fought and killed Europeans. The aura of white invincibility, of inherent superiority, must have been shaken. As Lugard stated in a letter to his wife regarding the Nigerian soldier, "He also knows how to kill white men, around whom he has been taught to weave a web of sanctity of life. He also knows how to handle bombs and Lewis and Maxims - and he has seen white men budge when he stood fast. And altogether he has acquired much knowledge which might be put to uncomfortable use some day." [22]

It seems impractical that traditional authority could hope to retain the allegiance of men who were mixing with so many different nationalities and seeing so many contrasting ways of life. War was bound to stimulate powerful forces of nationalism in Africa.

d. Summary

Begun in 1914, the Lugard amalgamation plan resulted in the ossification of regional separatism and the evolution of a Nigerian community which shared little in common, other than government by Britain. Characterized by ethnic tension, suspicion of British motives, and overt antagonism the efforts of Lugard and his policy were to undermine the fabric of Nigerian nationalism well beyond the day of Nigerian independence.

3. Nationalism and Constitutional Evolution

The practical effects of the war experience were seen immediately after 1918 in the growth of nationalist sentiment. But, the dislocation caused by the war also had its impact on British policy. Lugard's policy represented an attempt to reverse the conventional colonial principles that had emerged from Britain's experience in its American colonies. Since the 18th century Britain had found that the inhabitants of its colonies demanded an increasing share in the determination of their lives. Following the American Revolution the principle of self-determination was recognized in Britain as a first priority of colonial government.

As Britain began to acquire colonial territories on the coast of west Africa during the 19th century, the question arose as to whether the concept of representative government, which was being applied to the white-settled colonies, was suitable for those in Africa.

a. The Constitution of 1922

Early on it was clear that each British colony would have a considerable degree of autonomous responsibility, varying according to local circumstances and the personalities of the officials concerned. The acceptance of

this necessity led to the creation of the kind of councils that had formed the foundations of representative institutions in the other colonies. Thus, during the middle years of the 19th century, executive and legislative councils were established as part of the British governmental structure in west Africa.

These councils did not develop along representative lines, as had those of the other colonies. They consisted of officials and laymen nominated by the government. It might have been expected that a representative system would have developed out of this infancy - it did not. First, because of the trend against the appointment of Africans to positions of responsibility that occurred toward the end of the century and, second, because of Lugard's dislike of African representation. Yet even Lugard could not prevent the progress toward representative institutions that started again after the war.

. The legislative council constituted in 1922 was, probably, not a product of nationalist pressure. First, the governor had been very critical in his references to nationalist activity as recently as 1920 and, two, the electoral system had been introduced for the town council of Lagos in 1920, before the nationalists had made their presence felt. However, the legislative council was to include the first directly elected Africans in British Africa, and certainly represented a dramatic change in British attitudes towards the nationalists. "This change probably resulted from two interrelated causes. First, the war with its rhetoric about "self-determination" had affected the climate for colonial policy. And second, the changed climate of opinion had also influenced the British Parliament concerning the need for some form of representative system in the colonies they governed." [23]

The Constitution of 1922, which introduced the legislative council, marked a new stage in Nigerian political development. "The Nigerian Council had never been more than a phantom institution, dominated by the British government, its Africans selected for their quiescence, its function purely advisory, and its meetings rare." [24] The new council was a totally different kind of body and the fact that direct elections were to be held in Lagos and Calabar was the constitution's most momentous feature. "The significance of the electoral principle outweighed all reservations: it was at the proclamation of the constitution of 1922 that modern politics were born in Nigeria." [25]

The elections which took place in 1923, 1928, and 1933 were much more significant as an outlet for political activity than they were for their outcomes. However, the election process continued to be confined to the cities of Lagos and Calabar despite a promise that it would be extended to other areas. This provided a focus for political agitation.

The most serious protest arose among the Ibo. Bitterly resentful of the authority invested in the "warrant chiefs" and hounded by taxes they considered unfair, the Ibos rioted in 1927 and again in 1929 to protest the tax increases. The 1929 riots were led by women who feared that a tax was going to be extended to them which would exacerbate already low produce prices. Most of the violence was directed at administrative buildings and houses of warrant chiefs. Thirty-two people were killed [26] when police fired into the demonstrators. Subsequent commissions of African barristers were appointed to examine the actions of British officials. These appointments served to assuage some African hostility but, "the whole affair conclusively proved that the administration of the east and of the western areas bordering the east would have to be drastically changed if further violence was to be avoided." [27]

At this time another British administrator, Donald Cameron, arrived in Nigeria from Tanganyika (Tanzania). He quickly assessed the folly of Lugard's separatist policies and instituted rapid change to alleviate the tension being created by the unworkable policies of indirect rule. In Yorubaland, he stopped the effort to return to the past glories of Oyo and implemented a plan to develop a government free from the old ways, and which would include educated Africans in the native authorities.

Among the Ibo, he returned to a system closely resembling the one which Lugard had replaced and he abolished the provincial courts while lessening the power of the native courts, "thereby doing away with the bitter criticisms of the administration of justice that had been a major factor in popular resentment." [28]

He established a high court to sit for the whole protectorate and abolished the system in which both the north and the south had a lieutenant governor. All of these actions had the dual impact of appeasing educated Africans and helping to reduce the separation of the two regions (north and south).

Few other changes were made in the administration of Nigeria before the end of World War II. Essentially, the country remained a collection of separate communities linked together by British rule. However, elements were developing that were to have an influence for change. Though some aspects of British rule had persistently separated rather than drawn together the various communities, "colonial government had in itself produced a single political unit for the first time." [29] Although, often invisible, an element of national identification was induced. Educated Africans looked toward the central government either for their employment or for participation in decision-making. They began to develop a common consciousness, irrespective

of their communities or origin. Gradually, some sense of national identity began to appear among the minority of educated elite.

"It would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that Nigeria showed signs of becoming a modern nation-state in the period, but between the two world wars colonial government was unconsciously providing a catalyst around which resentments, ambitions, hopes, and ideas could fuse into a common, if varied, body of opinion on the future of the country." [30]

b. World War II

"Possibly the greatest effect of Nigeria's participation in World War II was the sudden realization by a large number of ordinary Nigerians (as distinct from the educated elite) that there were Europeans who were different from the privileged colonial administration. Europeans who were farmers and private soldiers, traders and shopkeepers, bootblacks and servants like the Nigerians themselves." [31] Again, as in the first world war, Nigerians began to think of themselves as a nation equal to that of the Europeans. As the differences in perceptions narrowed, the force of Nigerian nationalism began to slowly move towards an uncertain goal of self-determination in a loosely confederated political entity which was becoming the Nigerian nation.

c. The Richards Constitution of 1945

The year that World War II ended was also a pivotal year for Nigeria's future-A new constitution was published. The constitutional proposals of Sir Arthur Richards in March 1945, marked the real turning point in Nigeria's progress towards independence. "The constitution, which came into effect on 1 January 1947, had three objectives:

1. To promote the unity of Nigeria.
2. To provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which make up the country.
3. To secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs." [32]

The most important feature of the new constitution was the inclusion of the north in the central legislature, a move which furthered the unity of the country. However, simultaneously, regional councils were created for the North, East, and West. Though they were mainly confined to discussion, their creation has been severely criticized as being the foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics. Richards argued that, "the inclusion of the North, so long separated from participation in national politics, necessitated some degree of regionalization to allow for its very obvious differences from the South." [33] However, before the Richards Constitution, the keynote in Nigerian politics was unification towards a centralized state (somewhat misdirected under Lugard's amalgamation plan) and the realization of a common nationality. But, with the new constitution this process seemed to be halted.

In the summer of 1945 the resentment provoked by the Richards Constitution was compounded by economic discontent. Young Nigerians became disgruntled over two gross economic inequities. One, almost every high ranking job was reserved for Europeans. Two, there was a wide disparity in salary between Africans and Europeans doing the same job. These two problems prompted a general strike by the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, which paralyzed the vital services of the country. The ultimate decision, by British authorities, to grant Nigerian workers a cost of living increase was considered a meaningful success by the Nigerian unions.

Spurred on by the apparent success of the strike and united under a single leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, the

period between 1945-1947 presents a high water mark in early Nigerian efforts for self-determination. However, Azikwe's inability to consolidate his successes lead to his ultimate failure as a possible candidate to lead Nigeria into independence. [34]

By 1948, The degree of unity attained under Azikwe and the trade union movement disappeared, with delegates from different ethnic groups exhibiting personal bitterness towards each other. "Nigeria, like the rest of west Africa, was suffering from postwar shortages and widespread unemployment, with the streets of Lagos filled with men seeking work. An element of revolt was visible." [35] In Nigeria the pressures seemed to exacerbate intercommunal conflicts, diluting the small degree of national unity that had been achieved.

There was one last effort to build a unified movement. "In November, 1949, a strike among coal miners at Enugu led to violence. The police were accused of shooting twenty-one miners." [36] The news of this massacre set off chain reactions in several other cities. A National Emergency Committee was formed to represent the case of the miners before a commission of inquiry. It was hoped that this Committee would hold together to present a united front in the campaign for self-government. However, The committee dissolved soon after presenting its case and Nigeria returned to communal politics.

d. The Macpherson Constitution of 1952

By late 1949 Richards had been replaced as governor by the more liberally minded, Sir John Macpherson. Macpherson realized that he was responsible for a society that was perched on a political powderkeg. "He quickly made it clear that he was prepared to revise the Richards Constitution, consult with African opinion, introduce

Africans into the higher civil service, and improve the facilities for higher education." [37]

Many Nigerians in the political world were convinced that Britain seriously intended to offer eventual self-government. It seemed to many that those who desired the end of colonial government were pushing an open door: "the real issue was what character self-government was to take and what was to be the timetable for independence." [38]

"What seems certain is that the offer of a new constitution and the wide ranging discussions over its nature were used by the Nigerians to seek communal and regional advantage rather than to envision the creation of a single nation state and forge the means of building it." [39] The whole debate on the new constitution was based on the issue of what form of regional federation should be recommended, with no discussion as to the divisive nature of communal politics. The constitutional conferences held in each of the three regions all proposed a federal system based on the existing regions. Each region was to be given a certain executive and legislative authority with an increase in the elected members to each political body. Differences surfaced between the two southern regions and the north concerning the extent of power to be left in colonial hands. The south wished to attain majority control of the executives while the north wanted to retain their British commissioners as the executive authorities. The consequences of isolating the north from modernizing trends were beginning to show.

The dangers in the federated regional system were recognized by many younger Nigerians. Various groups of young Nigerians submitted resolutions suggesting alternatives to the general conference. A particularly perceptive resolution came from the Nigeria Society, formed by students

in London. [40] The students proposed that the various ethnic groups should be given control over their domestic affairs without prejudice to the government of the country as a whole. "They suggested that Nigeria be divided into nine administrative units, so that none of them would be large enough to threaten the authority of the central government, and that loyalty to Nigeria must transcend all local attachments and sectarian alignments." [41] These young Nigerians were able to perceive the dangers that their elders refused to recognize as being more vital than their own immediate interests.

These warnings went virtually unheeded. A constitution emerged that provided a form of parliamentary government in each of the three regions and at the center. The division of powers between the center and the regions was somewhat vaguely defined, but the regions could make laws governing local social services, courts, taxation, agriculture, education, and various local economic matters, subject to the governor's final authority. However, it was the political implications rather than the details of the new constitution that were of major significance. What had not been anticipated was that political parties would be formed to contest the proposed elections.

There arose a dominant political party in each region. The NCNC concentrated on the east. In the west Awolowo founded the Action Group. In the North the traditionally based Northern's People Congress (NPC) was formed by Balewa. Later, Aminu Kano, led a breakaway party in the north, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). The success of Kano's party caused the more traditional NPC to reorganize. Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, became the dominant figure supported by the emirs.

"The first elections under the new constitution made it evident that, unless some massive groundswell caused

a revolt against the dominant trend, the future of Nigeria would be characterized by a balancing of interests and strengths between the three regional parties, by rivalry between north and south, and by conflict between majority and minority ethnic groups within each region. Those Nigerians in a position to influence the course of their country's history appeared to have accepted the underlying implications of the Lugard doctrine: "The major ethnic communities were to regard themselves as separate political entities. How could they simultaneously create a Nigerian nation state, or avoid provoking a constant clash of interests within the Nigerian framework, were questions that they seemed to avoid as sedulously as Lugard and the Colonial Office had avoided them in the past." [42]

The Macpherson constitution (which came into effect in 1952) though much more liberal than its predecessor, and more in keeping with Nigerian desires, was short lived. This ephemeral existence was created, in part, for two reasons. One, because of its own deficiencies. Two, because of the political situation at the time. From the party point of view there was a fundamental difference between those elements which wanted a constitution that would give greater powers to the central government, and those that wanted to retain as much power as possible in the regions.

In effect, the Macpherson constitution was a compromise between the two positions, effectively appointing power neither to the center nor the regions. Additionally, since its inception, it was touted as only a step towards further constitutional development, therefore, the various parties always seemed to have an eye on future change.

Throughout the life of the constitution political maneuvering continually threatened to bring about its demise. Tensions between the north and the two southern

regions came to a head over who would control the government. In time, the East managed to establish a minority coalition which was intolerable to the northern parties. The final breakdown came in 1952. The West proposed a bill demanding self government by 1956, the North was unable to support this motion as they felt they were as yet unready for self government. By failing to support the bill, the northern ministers, in conjunction with the European ministers, were able to stave off this early attempt at gaining Nigerian self government. In return, the north proposed a milder bill calling for self government as soon as practicable. Bitter resentment resulted between the North and South as a result of the North's reluctance to move toward independence. "The situation was particularly tense in Kano because of the large Southern minority in the Sabon Gari, or strangers quarter, and from 15-19 May 1956 there were serious communal riots with an official death toll of 36 killed and 241 wounded, though it is almost certain that the numbers were much larger." [43] Tribal and regional separatism came to a violent head during this time and there was much concern that Nigeria would be split in two. The long separation of the north and the south appeared to have left too great a gap for their recent political collusion to overcome. The immediate result of the riots was that the Nigerian constitution would be redrawn "to provide for greater regional autonomy and for removal of powers of intervention by the center in matters which could, without detriment to other regions, be placed entirely within regional competence." [44]

e. The Constitution of 1954

All of Nigeria's parties sent delegations to the new constitutional conference in London. There were many misgivings among the delegates which made success seem

almost impossible. The North wanted all powers delegated to the region with the exception of defense, customs, and a few others. The southern regions called for self government by 1956, an issue which was still being blocked by the adamant refusal of the north.

Against this unpromising atmosphere it is incredible how much agreement was reached by the delegates to the London conference. The three major parties (Action Group, NCNC, and NFC) agreed to a federal constitution in which residual powers would be transferred to the regions instead of the center, as had been the case under the old constitution. All the same, the center was given much wider powers than had been envisaged by the North. The question of self government by 1956 was avoided by offering self government to the regions that wished it by then but not to the entire federation. This maneuver left the North free to embark on self government whenever it felt secure enough to do so. This plan for self government represented a great concession by the British government which had previously stated; that self government could only be achieved when all of the regions felt they were ready at the same time. It seems reasonable that the British wished to avoid another riot, similar to that which occurred in Kano in 1956, by granting this concession. Additionally, this marked the first time the British had consented to a fixed date for self government.

The conference appeared as a great success. From a pessimistic beginning the rules for the actual functioning of the federation were settled by the delegates. "Nigeria became a full federation of three regions, a federal capital (Lagos), and the territory of the Southern Cameroons (a breakaway territory from eastern Nigeria). A national legislature of 184 members, half from the north, was to be elected every five years. Elections were to take place at

regional level under a system which varied from region to region." [45] The tendency towards the creation of three Nigerias was consolidated by the regionalization of the civil service and the judiciary. Most notably, in 1956, the Moslem Court of Appeal (an institution without precedence in the Islamic world) was set up to act as a bridge between the native Shari'a courts administering Islamic law and the High Courts.

Finally, the 1954 constitution transferred residual powers to the regions. At the close of the conference it was promised that the constitution would be reviewed in August 1956, however, despite some subsequent changes, it became the constitution which laid down the basic pattern of government which was to take Nigeria through independence and beyond.

4. Independence

"The 1954 constitution marked the end of the nationalist struggle with Britain; for the next six years, until the achievement of independence on 1 October 1960, Nigerian leaders were preoccupied not so much with wresting power from the colonial government as dealing with the day-to-day administration and development of the their country as well as settling the basis on which they would co-operate with each other." [46] It was, therefore, not surprising that the year after the new constitution came into effect was a quiet one, while ministers and other civil servants began learning the mechanics of their new jobs.

While the Nigerian leaders were engrossed in the intricacies of learning their new governmental structure they were also able to keep an eye on the constitutional review scheduled for 1956. At that time it was assumed that both the East and the West would cash in on the British promise of self government by 1956. Due to some political

party rivalries the actual conference took place in 1957. It was primarily concerned with constitutional revision in light of recent past experiences and in accordance with predicted constitutional advance. At the conference it was agreed that both the East and the West should have self government as soon as they wanted it.

It almost seemed that Nigeria was ready for independence in 1957. However, the North still refused to be rushed into self government maintaining their position that the Northern leadership was as yet unprepared to assume responsibility for the region's administration. The North was still suffering from the isolation imposed by the policy of indirect rule. With a large population and only a handful of university graduates, the North feared that its administration would be controlled by southern expatriates. Additionally, there still remained an uncertain relationship between the autocratic emirs and the new system of democracy. The Sardauna of Sokoto did not wish to inflame this relationship by pressing for self government. Therefore, it appeared in 1957, as though the Northern region would hold up the process of independence for the entire country through its reluctance to accept self government. Lugard's isolationists policies had finally come home to roost, or so it seemed. However, the Sardauna of Sokoto announced that the North would become self governing in 1959 causing considerable relief among the other delegates in 1957.

The most complex problem facing the 1957 delegation was the issue of minority groups. Since the inception of the Macpherson constitution these groups had been working to avoid political domination by the major regional ethnic groups. The efforts of the minorities to assuage this domination centered on their proposal to create new states which would enhance equality in the political process. A Minorities Commission was established and charged with

making a recommendation on this difficult problem. The Commission reported that it was unnecessary to establish new states since solutions could best be found in the existing governmental structure. In 1958 the Second Conference accepted the Minorities report. "The agreement over the Minorities report was influenced by the fact that none of the parties cared to stand out on the issue for fear of being branded as the one that held up independence." [47] It might seem that the Commission dodged the issue (especially since it was widely known that the British government would consider the creation of new states as a factor in delaying independence). The Commission's thinking centered on the idea that none of the three major parties would be able to dominate the other and that any party seeking domination would have to go outside its regional stronghold and seek support among the minority groups of the other regions. As it turned out the elections of 1959 showed just how dominant a factor the minorities remained in the Nigerian political arena. The elections showed that no party was strong enough to form a government by itself. The minorities had precluded regional domination of the Nigerian elections and forced a coalition government.

The 1959 elections repeated a familiar pattern. The North dominated the Federal House and the NPC dominated the Senate. No party gained sufficient numbers to form its own government and after some intense bargaining the NPC and the NCNC resumed their coalition. Balewa was reappointed as the prime minister.

"The new legislature duly requested independence from the British government; the parliament at Westminster thereupon passed an independence act on the basis of the constitution that Nigerians themselves had approved. In October 1960, Nigeria became an independent state and shortly thereafter was accepted as a member of the United Nations." [48]

The era of British rule had lasted less than a century and direct colonial rule over the country had lasted just sixty years. During that time nothing had been fundamentally altered, except that the pluralistic society of a large country had become a single political unit. The societies within this country had remained essentially unaltered. The actual event of independence was less than momentous serving only to pass the major issues of the country directly to the Nigerians themselves. The central issues of ethno regional politics in a highly pluralistic society remained the same before and after October 1960.

E. CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN POST-INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA

"Nigeria, at independence, presented the classic picture of the ex-colonial state whose constitutional forms were designed to satisfy the terms of colonial withdrawal rather than cope effectively with the realities of its own political conditions." [49]

Prior to Independence, Nigeria's leaders accepted the premise that British forms of government were suited to Nigeria's needs. Simultaneously, the construction of the Nigerian federal system had been devised by the British Colonial Administration wholly for purposes of effective British control. "Structural contradictions abounded: Most notably the anomaly that the northern segment was larger than all the others put together yet was also the poorest, educationally most disadvantaged, and least prepared culturally to engage in the games of modern democratic politics. This situation was a legacy to the postindependence era." [50]

The question of constitutional change became an immediate controversy in postindependence politics. Within a short time each major party had repudiated one or more of

the central provisions in the existing constitution. These actions combined with the realities of the plural nature of Nigeria's social makeup promoted increasingly destructive forces of regional political rivalry. The salient features of this bitter regionalism, and the dynamics of the unrestrained party competition within the Nigerian federation were:

1. Regional power: The original pattern of Nigerian political regionalism reflected a genuine diversity of geopolitical and cultural sections. In the north the majority Hausa-Fulani sustained Islam influenced social institutions, including political structures that were hierarchical, authority centered, bureaucratic, and ascriptive. Their degree of assimilation within the colonial structure was highly limited, primarily due to the policy of Indirect rule.

In the west the Yoruba were roughly divided between Muslims and Christians, and were politically devoted to the principles of a limited monarchy. Their penetration by colonial authority was early and intense.

In contrast to both groups, the Ibo in the east, rejected centralized authority in favor of a network of segmented units that endorsed egalitarian principles and aggressive individual initiative. Their attitude toward western influenced change was perceived as aggressively opportunistic.

Additionally, a great number of minority ethnic groups, with varying features of social and political organization, comprised roughly half the total Nigerian population. Their cultures were often besieged and assimilated by the major ethnic groups.

From the outset of their incorporation into the Nigerian federation each of these majority and minority peoples experienced acute apprehension of political domination by

another. The hallmark of all these groups was isolationism rather than expansionism, combined with mutual accusations that each desired to dominate the whole. The essential parochialism of this era was abetted by distribution of constitutional powers that placed the regional units of the original federation in a decisive position. As a result of the 1959 elections and the promotion of regional hegemonic ambitions it became impossible for any real difference to exist between perceptions of regional power and calculations of national dominance.

2. Party competition and party structure: "Another way to focus on what had gone wrong in Nigeria was to discover why political party competition had failed to have the beneficial effects expected of it. In theory (and in terms of lessons learned within the western experience) conditions of social pluralism are expected to stimulate political parties to act as agents of an integrative process involving brokering, bargaining, compromise, problem solving, negotiation, coalescence, and like activities indicative of the problem solving process." [51]

The notion that the combination of social pluralism and democratic competition automatically produces politically stabilizing results seems unlikely in the Nigerian case. The problem that evolved was; political competition rapidly deteriorated into political enmity.

Perhaps the most significant example of this contradiction between competition and enmity lies in the challenge of cross regional penetration of one party into the geographical and cultural area of another. The logic of the competition dictated that the attempt be made in order to gain a wider political base. However, success exacerbated fears not so much of winner-take-all but of loser-forfeit-all resulting in exclusion from the national

scene. Failure to penetrate other regions generated frustration at the parties inability to improve its position. The more the system provoked these negative experiences, the more anger and disillusionment was directed toward the constitutional settlement which had designed the situation. The more the constitution lost acceptance, the more virulent were cross party perceptions. Within the old constitutional framework only more effective mobilization of ethnic power offered any hope of change.

1. The Conflict Begins

By 1964, Nigeria was facing a major political crisis. The extremes of regional politics, a rapidly expanding economy, and a widening social stratification contributed to a political and social environment which can only be described as chaotic. The elections in that year became the death knell for Nigerias democratic republic.

Called a farce by many, the 1964 elections again resulted in a coalition government which excluded the Action Group. The actual events of the election exceed the scope of this paper, however, at their conclusion there were many in Nigeria who were disgusted with the conduct of federal politics and who believed that they could manage affairs better within their own communities.

In 1965, a follow on election in the west marked the final phase in Nigerias postindependence political institutions. Again, the details are not as important as the outcome. The personalities involved, while significant, succumb to the tragedy of events which surrounded this regional election. Arrests, riots, and shootings accompanied this farcical attempt at democracy. A chaotic outcome evolved whereby the contending parties both claimed the right to form a government. The leader who emerged, Akintola, was suspected of allying with the central

government to prevent a coalition government of the Action Group and the NCNC from winning the west. This chaotic pattern of government was to be shortlived as other forces were at work to take control of Nigeria's government. The 1965 election was tragically significant for the future. It is estimated that approximately 2,000 people were killed and many of those were northern Hausa. The repercussions of these actions were to bear heavily on the future of Nigeria's government.

a. The First Coup

The first Nigerian republic was on its deathbed by 1966. There had been hints of military intervention but these rumors were discounted by Prime Minister Balewa and others based on the assurances of the special police. However, during the night following a conference between Akintola and Bello to halt the Action Group-NCNC coalition a coup was executed. By the next day Akintola, Balewa, and Bello were dead as well as the chief finance minister, who had been a decadent symbol of ostentatious living in Nigerian government. [52] A number of northern army officers were also killed but neither southern premier was harmed in Benin nor Enugu. General Ironsi, the military commander was trying to gain control of the army during this time, and did prevent it from occupying Lagos.

In the capital there was chaos. President Azikwe was in London and no one knew for sure the fate of Balewa. Questions arose as to whether or not to appoint another Prime Minister and whether or not he should be from the north or south. Eventually, General Ironsi, an Ibo, assumed power and he formed a military government stressing the temporary nature of his actions while promising to seek a new constitution and stamp out corruption and dishonesty. The country seemed relieved to be free of the political

circus which had marred Nigerian political life. Everyone was content to await developments under the new revolutionary government.

It did not take long to realize that Ironsi was essentially a soldier and not a politician. He made numerous mistakes and tended to think mainly as an Ibo. His honeymoon period was shortlived. Northerners became suspicious of his plan to abolish the regions and make them provinces under a central authority in a type of unification scheme. The north feared Ibo domination and they recalled that it was mainly northerners who had been killed in the coup which had been led by Ibo officers. Ironsi tried to initiate reforms but was unsuccessful. The idea that the coup was a plot to impose Ibo (southern) domination over the country gained ground. Ibo's began boasting of killing the Sarduna (Bello) and resentment in the north gained momentum.

In May, 1966, Ironsi published his Unification Decree. Northern resentment exploded into violence as riots again swept the sabon gari outside of Kano. Northerners swept through the predominantly Ibo settlement killing and burning. It seemed as if their day of revenge had come and as the violence spread there was also talk of open secession.

b. The Second Coup

By May it was clear that the first coup had solved little. Further coups seemed to be widely expected although there was some conjecture as to whether they would come from the north or the south. In July, 1966, while he was staying in Ibadan, Ironsi was siezed by northern soldiers and shot. Again the army was torn by ethnic loyalties as easterners were killed by northern mutineers. General Gowon, the army chief of staff, was sent to negotiate with the mutineers and within a short time he had

emerged as the new supreme commander and immediately repealed the Unification Decree, which had been Ironsi's downfall.

Gowon was, himself, an oddity for although he was a northerner he was also a Christian. Educated at Sandhurst in England, he was a sincere, shy, modest man who became the only symbol of national unity in Nigeria.

Gowon's first step was to quell the factional infighting within the army. He did this by posting soldiers to garrisons in their own regions. This solution worked fairly well in the short run but it tended to exacerbate two problems. One, there were very few Yoruba in the army, consequently, Gowon had to station northern troops in the west, a maneuver which appeared to western leaders like an army of occupation. Two, by splitting the army Gowon fostered the growth of regionalism and, in particular, gave the eastern region its own defensive capability. Additionally, most of the best officers were Ibo's and by splitting the army along ethnic lines Gowon tended to strip the rest of his army of competent leadership; a problem which was to surface dramatically during the conduct of the civil war.

Gowon's next step was constitutional review as he was genuinely anxious to return Nigeria to civilian rule as soon as possible. A conference was called comprised of regional leaders. The content of the conference seems somewhat insignificant for this paper. The north which had originally voted for a loose association with the right of regions to secede changed its tune and began to demand a strong central government, probably as a result of pressure from minority groups which did not want to return to a regional system dominated by the major ethnic factions. However, these debates were violently interrupted as a second massacre of easterners began in the north.

c. Black Thursday

Resentment against Ibo economic, educational, and technical superiority had been simmering in the north for years. It became a case where an alien minority began to economically dominate a larger community. On this occasion the fury of the northerners was aroused by reports that northerners had been killed in the east. "On what is now referred to in Nigeria as "Black Thursday," September 29, 1966, mob violence broke out against the tens of thousands of Ibos who until then had been shopkeepers, civil servants, and service workers throughout the north. Estimates of the number of deaths range from 5,000 to 50,000, and the number of Ibos who subsequently returned home as refugees from around the federation may have ranged from 700,000 to 2,000,000. There were reprisals against Northerners living in the east, although there had been relatively few Hausa-Fulani in the region." [53]

The events in the north and east made further constitutional discussions academic. General Ojukwu, the military governor of the eastern region, faced the monumental task of caring for the flood of refugees streaming into the eastern region. Ojukwu refused to meet further in Lagos unless his personal security could be assured. Furthermore, Ojukwu found no reason to recognize Gowon's authority and he was being pressed by high ranking civil servants to seek secession. It seems that, "the massacres in the north and the return of refugees, however atrocious, also benefitted Ojukwu's military regime in the east. The immediate effect was to traumatize much of the population and, as Ojukwu later recalled, the shock enabled him to consolidate support that carried him through the secession." [54]

2. Civil War

Conditions deteriorated steadily after the violence in the north and in January, 1967, after several abortive attempts Nigeria's military leaders met in Ghana to try and avoid what appeared to be an inevitable rush towards the dissolution of Nigeria. Ojukwu dominated this conference and refused to accept any proposals which would allow the federal government to interfere in regional affairs. Significantly, in March, 1967, Ojukwu appropriated all federal revenues collected in his region. This action placed all of Nigeria on the verge of disintegration and in a final effort to save the federation from total collapse the north, which violently opposed the creation of new states, agreed to allow an increased number of states in their region. This action brought the west into an agreement for a stronger central government and led to the establishment of sanctions against the east. Despite several efforts by the central government at reconciliation with Ojukwu, the east moved relentlessly toward secession and on 26 May, 1967 Ojukwu declared the eastern region a free and sovereign state hereafter to be referred to as the Republic of Biafra. At the same time he dissolved all ties with the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

General Gowon immediately declared a state of emergency and reimposed the blockade of the east. Simultaneously, he announced that Nigeria would be divided into twelve states. However, Ojukwu persisted in his effort to declare the eastern region a free and sovereign state and war between the east and the rest of Nigeria became inevitable.

The conduct of the civil war was significant both for Nigeria and the nations in sub-Saharan Africa with a vested interest in discouraging secessionist movements. The

intricacies, international ramifications, and conduct of the civil war have been well documented in other works [55] and are beyond the purview of this paper. Most significantly, the war began on July, 1967 and ended on 12 January, 1970 and resulted in the complete disruption of Nigerian politics and economy. The eastern region was beset by starvation, disease, and poverty and all of Nigeria was suffering from the enmity precipitated by the onslaught of what some have called the Brothers War. The civil war marked the culmination of a series of policies beginning with Lugard's Indirect Rule, that perpetrated the rise of ethnoregional political entities and fostered the emergence of a divided, regionally based, political structure that enhanced the plurality which plagued the course of Nigerian unity.

C. POST CIVIL WAR POLITICS

The problems of the Gowon regime, once it had gotten beyond successful completion of the civil war, took somewhat longer to unfold but were just as rooted in the dilemma of entrenched structure, change and legitimacy. Gowon's own selection as head of state had been the result of negotiations among factions of the military that were, in part, ethnically conceived. In terms of military norms his elevation was irregular as he was a junior officer. Furthermore, the convoluted circumstances of the military rise to power had made for a certain ambivalence in defining the role of his government. As a result, there was on one hand, the stamp of a caretaker mission reflecting a promise to restore Nigerian democracy at an early date. On the other hand, there was the more strictly praetorian projection of being a corrective regime dedicated to structural reforms beyond the capacity of civilian politicians. In these terms, the performance of the Gowon regime may have been doomed from

the start. It was neither convincingly corrective, as it proceeded to temporize on virtually every major area of reform, nor plausible, as the announced deadlines for the return to civilian rule came and went.

Among the measures temporized were the census of 1973, which was eventually rejected, the persistent issue for the creation of more states (Gowon favored a twelve state Federation), demobilization of the army, revenue reallocation, and action against a host of administrative abuses. Out of a nine point plan of reconstruction following the civil war at least six were cancelled. Eventually, both military and civilian leaders saw these failures as intrinsic to the regime.

The root of the difficulties lay in the regime's uncertain relationship to the sources of Nigerian social power. It lacked the political traction to take charge. Probably more important, was that Gowon (an essentially compromise military choice as head of state) felt unable to extend his own implicit mandate to uphold and balance rather than to govern the interests of various ethnic communities. The revelation of the regime's true character was the performance of the state's governors, who came to rival in corruption and arrogance the most negative image of the old regional style of civilian politics. Although that style seems to have been alien to Gowon himself.

1. The New Nigerian Constitutional System

After the ouster of General Gowon in 1975, the military regimes of Mohammed and Obasanjo adopted a staged program for the return to civil government by October 1979. The framework was to be the newly drafted constitution, which had been approved by a Constituent Assembly composed predominantly of members elected by local authorities, many of whom had been prominent in civilian politics of the

1960s. The assembly based its deliberations on the work of a constitutional drafting committee whose results were published as a draft for public review in October 1976.

Although the Federal Military Government (FMG) did not participate in the preparations, it did instruct the drafting committee to base its efforts on a federal structure that emphasized national unity rather than regional interests. The committee was asked to devise an executive system headed by a president, popularly elected, rather than chosen by parliament. To minimize sectoral antagonisms that had led to the downfall of the first civilian government, the drafting committee was charged with producing a plan that would ensure the organization of political parties on a national basis and a cabinet reflecting the federal character of the government. The broad outlines of the draft constitution were preserved intact during debates by the Constituent Assembly.

The Supreme Military Council (SMC), established by General Mchammed and carried on by General Obasanjo, introduced a moderate number of changes after the Constituent Assembly completed its work. Both the assembly and the SMC stiffened the provisions dealing with corruption and outside business interests by public officials. The SMC called for a number of existing provisions of law to be raised to constitutional status and thus be less vulnerable to modification or revocation.

By any reckoning, this period must be considered a dramatic occurrence in Nigerian political history as it permitted the assumption of new political directions in Nigeria. What can also be said is that the essence of the new political framework, in contrast to the old, is the decisive conviction that a deeply consultative process of political reconstruction offered the hope not so much of restoring legitimacy to national institutions as of creating it for the first time.

The new framework of democracy that was put in motion was not, primarily, the product of pressures to emulate Western experiences. On the contrary, the greatest significance of both the new constitution and of certain crucial supplementary administrative measures that together are the foundation of the new framework is that their primary point of historic reference is Nigerian experience. (See App A-structure of Government).

The crux of this departure is a machine of representation that is deliberately designed to break the destructive association between competitive party politics and disintegrative tendencies. These include the introduction of an executive presidency that must be won through electoral rules which stipulate that the winning candidate must receive not only the highest single number of votes but also 25 percent of the votes cast in two-thirds of the nineteen Nigerian states. Failing that, he must be selected by an electoral college involving all the national and state representative legislative bodies. The provision was intended to make becoming president of Nigeria impossible without a preponderance of inter-regional support. Equally central to this structure was the administrative creation of nineteen states whose boundaries cut across the geographical and cultural redoubts of the majority ethnic nations.

The area of innovation that occasioned the boldest strokes was that of the constitutional regulation of political parties. Provisions extend so far as to prescribe a minimum ethnic mix in the internal party structure. Furthermore, the main source of party campaign finances is the government, which empowers a strong Electoral Commission to set limits on expenditures as well as on conduct. Membership in all parties must be open to all Nigerians irrespective of place of origin or religion.

2. The 1979 Elections - A New Beginning

Political life returned to Nigeria when five polling days were set aside in July and August 1979 for elections to the federal and state assemblies, state governorships, and finally for direct national balloting for the president and vice president. All Nigerians over eighteen were guaranteed voting rights by the Constitution, including women of the former Northern region previously denied. Rules were imposed by the outgoing military government to limit the number of political parties to those that could demonstrate a national following and to induce the five political parties that were officially recognized to conduct their campaigns on the basis of nationwide rather than sectional appeals.

In preparing for the reestablishment of civilian political life in Nigeria, a priority objective of the military governors was to attenuate the ethnic and regional rivalries that had led to violence and the breakdown of the civilian government of 1960-1966. The redrawing of the boundaries of the four regions into twelve and then nineteen states, checking the Hausa-Fulani domination of northern politics, and enabling smaller ethnic groups to obtain a share of political power were essential steps in this process. The military government rescinded the ban on political parties in 1978 and empowered the independent FEDECO to receive applications for registration of parties. FEDECO was required by the new Constitution to restrict recognition to those parties having offices in at least two-thirds of the states, party names devoid of ethnic, religious, or geographic connotations, memberships open to all citizens, and headquarters in the capital city of Lagos. Nineteen parties applied, only five met the qualifications.

Elaborate preparations preceded the most massive election ever conducted in Africa. To accommodate over 47 million registered voters, 97,000 polling stations were readied and 400,000 election officers designated. The turnout of voters was, however, disappointing, attaining its peak of 35 percent only in the presidential election. This poor turnout prompted many candidates to declare the election illegal and brought numerous charges of faulty or inadequate registration of voters.

Shagari of the NPN received 5,688,857 votes and was elected as Nigeria's first executive president along with his vice presidential running mate, Alex Ekwueme. Awolowo, the candidate of the UPN, followed closely with 4,916,651 votes. The new constitution required that an electoral college of the Senate, House, and state assemblies select the president from the two leading candidates unless one candidate demonstrated more than sectional appeal by securing 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of Nigeria's nineteen states. Shagari did win more than 25 percent in twelve states but only 19.9 in the thirteenth, Kano. Although FEDECO had previously ruled that thirteen states constituted the mandated two-thirds majority, it declared Shagari the winner by finding that by gaining one-fourth of two-thirds (one-sixth) in the thirteenth state, he had been elected in the first round. FEDECO's decision was regarded as clumsy and clouded Shagari's victory. It was confirmed, however, by a special tribunal whose findings were upheld by the Supreme Court. In defense of the finding it was noted that Shagari proved to be the only candidate with more than a regional following. Moreover, it was feared that if the election were shifted to the national and state legislatures, an opportunistic political deal could transfer victory to Awolowo, thereby thwarting the popular will and introducing political tensions at the outset of civilian rule.

The NPN emerged as the most successful party in the Senate and House of Representatives elections, although it did not secure a majority vote in either body. The relatively broad appeal of the NPN was most apparent in the House where it was able to elect two or more representatives from sixteen of the nineteen states. In both houses Awolowo's UPN showed the second greatest strength. Azikiwe's NPP, which was third strongest in the Senate and House contests, joined the NPN in a coalition that provided the NPN-NPP a working majority in both houses. The PRP and the GNPP trailed the three main parties at some distance.

In the state elections traditional regional and ethnic voting patterns remained in evidence, notably in the south where the UPN overwhelmed other parties in the Yoruba dominated states of Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, and Lagos and won easily in Bendel State with its varied population. The NPP won decisively in the heavily Ibo states of Anambra and Imo and the more ethnically mixed Plateau State. The results of the North reflected sectional loyalties to a lesser degree. The NPN, regarded as the party of the Hausa-Fulani conservative establishment, did win with large majorities in the more traditional states such as Niger, Bauchi, and Sokoto. It was, however, decisively defeated in Kano State and lost the governorship in Kaduna State while the GNPP took the northeastern states of Gongola and Borno, which have predominant Kanuri populations. The socialist oriented PRP won strongly in the populous, relatively industrialized northern state of Kano and also won the governorship of neighboring Kaduna. Modernizing tendencies in the north linked to economic growth, better education, and distaste for continued emirate domination appeared to contribute to the rifts in the north.

Overall structural results of the 1979 elections are important. Several developments that appear to reflect

movement in the structural dynamics of party competition towards a more balanced distribution of national power and which are indicative of less parochial strategies include the following:

1. The running mate of each presidential candidate was from a cultural area, state, or region other than that of the presidential contender.
2. No party won all the elected posts within its cultural area, state, or region.
3. No party failed to win a significant number of votes outside its cultural area, state, or region.
4. No party scored a majority or plurality nationally merely by virtue of victory in its home cultural area, state, or region.
5. The categories of "elected unopposed" declined sharply as did failures to secure the required minimum number of votes.
6. Except for the PRP, all parties won at least 5 percent of the votes of other regions.
7. The NPN won 53.2 percent of its subpresidential votes outside its own region.
8. Each party won a significant number of subpresidential posts and no party was shutout.
9. Out of a total of 1,910 subpresidential elected offices, no party received less than 10 percent or more than 36.5 percent of the total.
10. Each of the five parties won control of the governorship in at least two states and of the State Assembly in at least one.
11. The Hausa-Fulani party (NPN) increased its share of the old Eastern vote from 0 to 33.6 percent and increased its share of the vote in the West and Lagos from 0 to 2 percent and 22.1 percent, respectively. It suffered a decline in the percentage of the Northern vote, from 61 percent to 55.4 percent.

12. The Ibo party (NPP) share of the old Eastern vote declined from 64 percent to 60.7 percent, although its share of the votes in other regions also declined, and more sharply.

13. Only the Yoruba party (UPN) can be said to have become, in these terms, more parochial since 1959.

The acid test of the Second Republic, as was true also of the First, will be its capacity to sustain nonviolent transfers of power and in the interim to allow effective exercise of opposing powers at both state and local levels. The inability of the First Republic to pass such tests inhered partly in the tendency for all important political conflict to be resolved into structural antagonisms, pursued under the framework of pure constitutional permissiveness. The innovative framework of the Second Republic has been traced to a determination to counteract the worst results of these arrangements. The question now arises whether in these terms the framework of the Second Republic is actually making any difference in the conduct of politics.

D. THE 80'S - CONTINUITY OR CHANGE

Since Nigeria's return to a democratic civilian government many forces - political, social, and economic - have arisen to threaten the fabric of Nigeria's new institutions. Nigeria's capacity to sustain non-violent transfers of power and its capacity to maintain a democratic form of government have been plagued by an erratic, oil based economy, a destabilized population as a result of increasing urban migration, the continuance of ethnic frictions prevalent since the beginning of Britain's colonial governance, and most recently, by a new form of dissent wrapped in the guise of Islamic fundamentalism.

In the next three chapters three forces, Islam, ethnicity, and the economy, which will influence the political growth and development of Nigeria in the 80's will be briefly analyzed. The intent of this analysis is to determine the likelihood that any of these three forces could become a medium for significant social or political change in Nigeria's future.

III. ISLAMIC VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA-FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE 80'S

While Nigeria faces but a few threats from external sources, it faces several grave threats from within. Paramount among these internal threats may be the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in northern Nigeria.

In 1980 and again in 1982 northern Nigeria was rocked by violent religious uprisings. These outbursts, attributed to Islamic fundamentalist groups, raised some serious questions for the Nigerian government. Both domestically and internationally there was concern that these outbursts could be the forerunner of a broader movement in the same vein as the Iranian Revolution. Secondly, there arose, within Nigeria, much speculation and apprehension about the origins of the riots and the nature of the participants. Finally, there was concern that these events were the symptoms of a larger socio-economic crisis facing Nigeria.

A. THE KANO RIOT

On 18 December, 1980 religious violence broke out in the city of Kano, Nigeria. A then obscure group known as the Yen Izala Sect marched on the central mosque of Kano declaring a Jihad against all Muslims who did not accept their teachings. As the state police stepped in to stop the march, violence erupted which ultimately resulted in the deaths of over 4,000 people. The enormity of so great a loss of life and the destructiveness created by the ensuing violence necessitates a greater understanding of the forces behind the 1980 riots.

Three motivations for the 1980 Kano riots, which I have conveniently labelled religious, political and international,

provide a means for analysis of the riots as well as the current trend of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria.

The first, and possibly most superficial motivation, was religion. The existence of fundamentalist groups in Nigeria is not new. The prevalence of the Qadariyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods has contributed to an overall brand of Islam in Nigeria which is essentially uncompromising and historically violent. The Yen Izala Sect, which is only one of a number of fundamentalist groups at work in the northern portion of Nigeria, seems to typify the more or less constant conflict between the brotherhoods concerning the comparative purity of their observance of Islam. The sects stated aim is, "to strike at materialism and privilege and to purify Islamic religious practice. However, it also claims to be against the need to face Mecca at prayer, against such ostentation as private houses and the possession of wrist watches." [56]

Led by Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa, also called the Maitesine, the Yen Izala Sect had a colorful leader whose past included deportation from Kano in 1962, a reappearance in Maiduguri in 1978, and his subsequent relocation back in Kano after the Borno State police destroyed the "hide-outs" of the sect in Maiduguri. Infused with an almost mystic fervor the followers of the Maitesine believed themselves invulnerable and rushed through the streets of Kano heedless of the fury of the violence which surrounded them.

On the surface a purely religious explanation for the 1980 riots is acceptable. All the ingredients; suppression, history, and martyrdom are present. However, it seems imperative to try and discover some other motivation for an act of violence so brutal that over 4,000 people, including the Maitesine, were killed. After all, the same conditions have been prevalent since the days of the 18th - 19th century Jihads, when Uthman dan Fodio initiated his holy wars to purify Islam in west Africa. What catalyst, after nearly

two centuries, ignited the reawakening of activity in northern Nigeria.

One explanation may be politics. "Dr. Junaid S. Muhammad, a member of the PRP and chief whip in the House of Representatives at the time, reportedly stated that the Kano riots were "a carefully conceived plan by the Mossad-The Israeli Zionist Secret Service-and Chief Awolowo, the leader of the UPN and a recent visitor, at that time, to Israel." [57]

Additionally, the seriousness of the violence pointed out several distinctive inadequacies in Nigerian security. First, the Nigerian police force was found to be ill trained and ill equipped and completely lacking in their ability to handle the emergency. As a result of these inadequacies the Army and the Air Force had to be called in to quell the riots, which led to further assertions that members of the armed services were defecting to the fanatics.

Secondly, the Kano incident clearly showed the laxity on the part of the Nigerian intelligence system. As articles in the Nigerian Tribune and the National Concord stated, "If a handful of religious fanatics could successfully take the law into their hands and for such a period of time, what prevents Colonel Qaddafi from launching an invasion against Nigeria from Chad?" With the destabilizing influence of Libya looming large in west Africa there was a growing suspicion that the Kano incident represented just the tip of a "Monstrous Iceberg" that would span all of the northern states. These statements combined with the severity of the riot provided lucrative political fodder for the detractors of President Shagari's infant government as well as contributing to a form of national paranoia concerning the aims of Libya and the possible connections between Qaddafi's insurrection into Chad and the simultaneous outbreak of violence in northern Nigeria. This paranoia led to much speculation

concerning the international ramifications of the Kano riots and provided the third motivation by which to analyze the disturbances.

The international motivation for the Kano riots emerges from two events. First, and most superficial, there was an attempt to connect the riots with Muslim extremists from Iran. This explanation has been discounted largely as a result of having not found any evidence to support it. The second event, which precipitated much more action and reaction, was a connection that was made between Libya's involvement in Chad and the almost simultaneous outbreak of violence in Kano.

Nigeria was faced with grave internal threats resulting from uneven economic development, rapid modernization, and extremes of ethno-regional tensions. "The Nigerian government was not only aware of these sources of instability, it was acutely sensitive to the potential linkages between domestic discontent and external threats. The riots in Kano provided the historical context for the seriousness with which Lagos viewed the threat from Libya, a country whose wealth, power, ideology, and religion could be used to exploit Nigeria's numerous internal divisions." [58]

In reaction to the Libyan invasion of Chad and the simultaneous outbreak of militant Islamic sects in Kano Nigeria instituted several policies: 1) The northern borders were reinforced with federal troops. 2) The defense budget was significantly increased. 3) Libyan diplomats were expelled from Lagos immediately following the Libyan-Chad merger. 4) President Shagari tried to meet with Qaddafi to call for an immediate withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad but Qaddafi refused to discuss the issue. 5) Nigeria backed an OAU effort to establish a peace-keeping force in Chad which would correspond to Libya's withdrawal.

In conjunction with these overt reactions was the growing concern among many Nigerian leaders about the large number of aliens coming into Nigeria, particularly, from Chad. A cursory analysis of the participants in the Kano riots lead to a conclusion that many of the rioters were aliens and not native Nigerians. Thereby, The stage was set, albeit unknowingly, for the mass expulsions which occurred in Nigeria in January 1983.

B. THE 1981 AND 1982 RIOTS

Since 1980 two other notable examples of Islamic related violence have occurred in Nigeria. In July, 1981, Largely as a result of a letter from Governor Rimi of Borno to the Emir of Kano, spontaneous rioting erupted in Kano. Essentially, the rioting was a reaction to what Muslims considered an insult to their spiritual leader. Governor Rimi outlined nine points in which he accused the Emir of showing disrespect on several occasions. When news of the letter became public, state buildings were attacked and either damaged or destroyed. Most notably, Dr. Bala Muhammad, the governor's political advisor and Dr. Muhammad's son were killed.

The scope of this incident was small by comparison to the 1980 disturbances, however, the implication was clear, that at least in northern Nigeria, the state was not yet strong enough to attack the Islamic religious hierarchy with impunity. The Islamic tradition proved stronger than the infancy of contemporary politics.

The third occurrence of religious violence took place in three northern cities during October 1982. It was a rekindling of the same forces which had fueled the 1980 Kano riots. A manifestation of a society suffering from the same pains of rapid modernization, erratic economic growth, mounting unemployment, and western intrusion into traditional societies.

The violence began on 26 October, 1982 in Maiduguri. Police had just "arrested sixteen members of a fundamentalist Muslim sect alledged to have been preaching without a license." [59] What ensued was three days of uncontrolled violence. It was quickly ascertained that the sect was the same one which had prompted the violent uprising in Kano in December, 1980. However, the preachers who were arrested had been claiming that the late Maitesine was the true prophet and that Mchammed was only an Arab whose name was insignificant.

The make-up of the sect appears to be relegated to the poor, jobless, unskilled rural immigrants many of whom are refugees and aliens seeking their fortunes in the relatively prosperous economic climate of Nigerian cities. In essence, it appears that the sect has offered an outlet for the growing number of dissatisfied people, following an Islamic model which advocated violence as the primary means of instigating change.

The numbers are confusing, however, best estimates placed the number of dead in Maiduguri at 350 sect members and 15 police. Subsequent rioting in Kaduna occurred on 29 October, 1982 when the police investigated reports that some 200 of the sects followers had fled to that town. The result was another 47 dead. In all, one can estimate that over 400 people died in five days of violent rioting.

As in 1980, the police proved inept at handling the emergencies. However, the Army and Air Force were withheld because of concerns over political tensions. Again Nigeria had been victimized by religious violence spawned by a sect that was heretical in nature and populated by foreigners, the jobless, and the multitudinous masses of dissatisfied Nigerians.

Finally, on 30 October, 1982, the last of this most recent series of riots took place. Muslim students in Kano

went on a rampage, burning down churches and hotels. "At first sight, it appears that the riots in Kano were nearly contemporaneous, but in no other way connected, with the Maiduguri and Kaduna disturbances. The rioters in Kano were members of the Muslim Students' Society (MSS) which, with its emphasis on doctrinal orthodoxy could hardly be considered in any degree sympathetic to Maitesine's movement which was decidedly heretical." [60] The impetus for this disturbance was the placement of an Anglican church too close to a Mosque. However, it was later learned that the Mosque was built in 1960 while the church had been built in 1926. The development in Kano was most disturbing "because it was not only inter-religious (unlike the Maitesine type which had been intra-religious) but it was the first time the traditional fanatics carried out their attacks right to the churches." [61]

A summary of the 1982 riots yields five areas of potential concern. First, the governments pardon of almost 1,000 Maitesine followers on the anniversary of Nigerian Independence (1 October, 1982) was believed by many, in Nigeria, to have lead directly to the disturbances. This further demonstrated the governments lack of understanding concerning the scope and character of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Nigeria. Government credibility was severely damaged as a result of this action.

Secondly, the riots again provided fertile ground for the exploitation of internal political troubles as many of the same claims made in 1980 were re-stated in 1982. Most notably, Mossad and Awolowo were again implicated as instigators and organizers of the riots.

Third, the 1982 riots took an even more anti-western demeanor, particularly in Kano, where western churches were attacked for the first time.

Fourth, the Nigerian internal security apparatus was again challenged, and again it came up short as it took four days to quell the violence in Maiduguri. It was apparant that the governments promise to bolster security within the states had fallen far short when confronted with reality. Closely associated with this was the governments perplexity when confronted by an entity which it felt had been destroyed in 1980. Again, the intelligence gathering agencies in Nigeria had not performed up to expectations.

Finally, the 1982 riots served to highlight the growing problem created by jobless aliens. The climate of poverty created by an influx of immigrants and a dwindling economy provided fertile grounds for the recruitment of dissatisfied young men into volital anti-establishment organizations. It was perhaps this concern, more than any other single force or incident which led to the mass expulsions of January-February 1983.

In an article entitled, "Nigeria: Whose Mistake." [62] The following reason was given as paramount for the mass expulsions from Nigeria. "It seems that the expulsion directive was precipitated by a report by the National Security Organization on last years (1982) religious riots. Up to 700,000 Chadians are liable to be affected by the order Chadians have long been implicated in most incidents of Islamic unrest in Nigeria in recent years."

The next section will trace the rise of Islam in Nigeria and provide a basis for the analysis of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism in that country.

C. THE HISTORY OF ISLAM IN NIGERIA

The history of Islam in Nigeria, prior to the 20th century, is inextricably interwoven into the fabric of West African history. There will be no attempt, here, to create

the definitive work on Islam in West Africa. [63] The purpose of this paper will be to incapsulate, in some chronological order, the spread of Islam in west Africa and its corresponding emergence in Nigeria. By this historical review it is hoped that the foundation will be laid for viewing Islam as a force for change in Nigeria. This paper will deal with specific aspects of the spread of Islam into west Africa (and Nigeria) and will, by no means, attempt to document every phase of Islamic expansion. The historic episodes chosen, I believe, will emphasize the role of Islam as a medium for change in the west African experience.

1. A Pocket Guide to Islam

Islam, today, is both a religion and a total way of life for greater than 750 million Muslims in over seventy countries. It is the youngest of the world's great religions (only fourteen centuries old) with its beginnings rooted in the drama of Mohammad's pilgrimage (the Hegira) from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D.

From its earliest days, Islam has had the power to unify diverse elements of culture and society into a bond of worldwide brotherhood. This success can be directly attributed to the implicitly 'simple' requirements of the religion. Based on the Quran and containing only five tenants or "Pillars of Faith," [64] Islam has combined a basic practicality with a notion of equality [65] to make it especially attractive to the peoples of sub-Sahara Africa. By accepting Islam, Africans gave up little and were able to maintain many elements of their traditional religion while, also, gaining educational opportunities and the ability to expand their commercial interests throughout the Muslim empire.

Islam presents itself in three basic forms:

1. Sunni - Also known as orthodox Islam. It is based on the hereditary succession of the Caliphate from Mhammad and the four right Caliphs and on Sharia law. It encompasses, approximately, 85 percent of all Muslims.
2. Shi'ite - A more militant, fundamental, branch of Islam. It differs from Sunni Islam in that it traces the Caliphate from Ali (the step son and true heir to Mhammad) and the descendants of Ali. The concept of the "Mahdi" [66] stems from Shi'ite Islam. This form of Islam is found in only a few areas of the Muslim world, including Iran.
3. Sufi - Somewhat of a blend between both Shi'ite and Sunni Islam. It is a mystical form of Islam, highly ceremonial, and heavily ritualized. Sufism gave rise to many sects and brotherhoods (including the whirling dervishes of the eastern Sudan) and became the most prominent form of Islam in west Africa. Sufism is often referred to as the most progressive form of Islam blending, as it does, parts of the other forms of Islam while adopting a modernist and adaptationist path. In west Africa, Sufism has a history as the most militant and reformist type of Islam.

2. Islam in West Africa: 10th - 15th Century

The spread of Islam in west Africa is a story of Dynastys. As early as the 10th century, Islam was being carried across the Sahara by nomads (primarily Berbers and Fulanis) and Arab traders. These Muslim traders had the effect of unifying populations under a single religion, an experience unique to west Africa.

The dynastic groupings in west Africa were already clearly defined prior to the incursion of Islam. Kingdoms existed which closely adhered to three elements characteristic of state building: [67]

1. There was a central authority, usually a king.
2. The loyalty of the people was, first, to the state, then to the groups within the state.
3. There was a concept that the state existed within certain territorial boundaries.

In west Africa, three major states began their existence during this era. They were Ghana, Mali, and Kanem-Borno. These major states were surrounded by many smaller states, [68] some of which gained importance in later centuries. These kingdoms all possessed some common features. First, each could be called an empire with large territorial holdings and a population loyal to a central government. Second, these empires dealt heavily in trans-Saharan trade. Gold and ivory were the major sources of revenue and, as trade increased, west Africa became the major source of gold for the Arabic world. Third, west African empires provided slaves to the Arabs. However, as more West Africans converted to Islam the harder it became for Arabs to exploit this aspect of trade since it is unlawful for Muslims to enslave other Muslims. Initially, this prohibition against Muslims enslaving one another may have been a significant factor in west African Islamic conversions. Fourth, the extent of these empires was larger than most European empires of the time. They possessed large armies, they were multi-ethnic, and they responded to a central authority. Fifth, Islam became increasingly important in these empires as Arab traders built mosques and acted as court recorders for the various dynasties. West African merchants converted to Islam to expand their economic opportunities by trading with their Arab counterparts within the great Muslim

brotherhood. Finally, within these empires Islam grew into a state religion and, for the first time, west Africans had a new and wider loyalty to a world religion that cut across both tribal and national loyalties.

a. Ghana

The first of the great west African empires was Ghana. Ruled by the Soninke ethnic group, Ghana covered a vast area bordered by the Senegal River to the West, the Niger River to the east, the Sahara desert to the north, and to the south, the forest areas. The rulers of Ghana maintained their traditional religions but used Muslim officials within their court to record events and enhance the prestige of the king. So large was the Muslim contingent within government that a separate Muslim city grew up outside the capital of Ghana.

At its peak, Ghana had the ability to field a 200,000 man army and was perpetually engaged in minor conflicts. Gold was the primary trading commodity and it was gold which first attracted Arab traders.

In 1076, Ghana was conquered by the Almoravids who had allied themselves with the small west African state of Takrur. [69] As a result of this conquest the inhabitants of Ghana were, largely, converted to Islam and Islam became the official state religion. After a series of historical episodes in which Ghana eventually reclaimed its independence, [70] the empire of Ghana slowly fell into decay and, by the 13th century, had been replaced by another west African power. As Ghana collapsed, the Soninke people spread throughout west Africa and became the most fervent proselytizers of the Islamic way of life.

b. Mali

Ghana was replaced, in west Africa, by the great Mandinka empire of Mali. Founded by the descendant of a Soninke warrior, the empire of Mali eclipsed the total area of Ghana, extending farther east along the Niger River and penetrating deep into the Sahara desert in the north.

In 1260 A.D. the ruler of Mali went on pilgrimage to Mecca, thereby, firmly establishing Islam as the state religion. In 1324, Mali's most famous ruler, Mansa Musa (1312-1337) made a great pilgrimage. During this pilgrimage Mansa accomplished several things which greatly affected West African history. One, enroute to Mecca he conquered the huge trading center of Timbuktu and brought that city under the control of Mali. Two, he managed to spend so much gold during his travels that he devalued Arabic currency. [71] Finally, he confirmed the presence of Islam in west Africa to the Arabic world, thereby, enhancing economic and political ties with the Caliphate.

Within its borders, Mali provided a stable environment where trade and commerce flourished. In conjunction with the free flow of trade there was a free flow of ideas and a corresponding rise in the growth of Islam as the people's religion.

By the 15th century Mali began its long period of decline. Frought with internal unrest and numerous civil wars, the great empire was eventually reduced to a series of petty chieftaincies. "With the decline of Mali Islam disappeared from the Mande regions, except for Dyula and Soninke trading colonies. During its decline, when kinship and mystery cults held undisputed sway in all successor states, teachers from the region sought new lives far outside its boundaries. Many Islamic communities in northern Nigeria attribute their conversion to missionaries from Mali. Thus,

in spite of the weak position of Islam as a kinship cult, Mali contributed to the Islamization of west Africa." [72]

Mali is credited with several achievements. First, it was the largest empire in the contemporary world. Secondly, it linked the Savannah states economically. Finally, Muslim scholarship flourished, on a large scale, among the urban elites.

c. Kanem-Borno

The last great empire begun in this era was that of Kanem-Borno. This empire developed around Lake Chad, far to the east of Ghana and Mali. It existed from, approximately, the 9th century until its fall in 1846.

Kanem-Borno was principally a trading state dealing in gold, ivory, and slaves. Its center was the trans-Saharan trade route but its borders were somewhat indistinct owing to its large nomadic constituency. In effect, Kanem-Borno was a large confederation of nomads who existed under an acknowledged ruling group.

Islam reached Kanem-Borno along the caravan routes and was established as the state religion in the 11th century by Mai (king) Hume, the thirteenth ruler, who made the pilgrimage. By the late 12th and early 13th century Islam had been accepted by all the elites of Kanem-Borno.

By the end of the 13th century the people of Kanem-Borno had merged into a single group, unified by the Kanuri language. By the 14th century this Kanuri speaking group had been driven from Kanem, the capital, and forced to resettle in Borno, southwest of Lake Chad. However, by the 15th century, under Mai Ali Gagi, the Kanuris (as they were then called) had driven out the invading Bulala tribe and consolidated the empire known as Kanem-Borno. Under this consolidation a large portion of what is now northern Nigeria existed within an Islamic state for several centuries.

d. Hausa States

Prior to the 15th century the history of many kingdoms in west Africa is indistinct. The greatest volume of information exists concerning the three kingdoms just discussed. However, several lesser kingdoms emerged during this time; the most prominent was the development of the Hausa States in the central Sudan.

The Hausa comprise one of the largest linguistic groups in Africa, but, they do not comprise an ethnic unity. Owing to a complex set of circumstances [73] the Hausa entity was able to extend the range of its common language and culture to encompass a number of city states known collectively as the Hausa States.

The Hausa States were, actually, a series of walled cities known as Birni, which existed as political units peculiar to the central Sudan. The leaders of these Birni formed elaborate courts and built large cities which tended to absorb the indigenous, nomadic, Berber and Tuareg populations. The Hausa city state of Kano became the main industrial center of the region while Katsina became important as the commercial hub of the trans-Saharan trade route.

In 1320, Katsina joined Islam. Islam had been fairly late in arriving among the Hausa due to an absence of trade routes in the earlier centuries. Islam was introduced during the reign of Ali (1349-1385) but turned out to be a mere facade, [74] for when Ali's son Kanajeje, a pagan worshipper, took the throne, Islam suffered a protracted setback.

Islam re-emerged under Muhammad Rimfa (1463-1499) coming to the Hausa States from many directions, including the pilgrim traffic, trade with North Africa and western Sudan, and the political influence of the Songhai and Kanem-Borno empires. Tokelari clerics from west Sudan and

Kanem-Borno, in the late 15th century, considerably aided the accomplishment of the urban religious revolution in the Hausa States. [75] The result of this Islamic resurgence was that Kano and Katsina became centers of Islamic teaching and gained considerable influence among Muslims in west Africa.

Of particular significance to this paper is that the Hausa States became the heartland of northern Nigeria and firmly established an Islamic tradition which persists to this day. The roots of Islam and Islamic resurgence pre-date, by centuries, the Nigerian Federation, and was the vehicle of change well before the colonial incursions of the late 19th century and early 20th century.

3. Islam in West Africa: 15th - 17th Century

It is the nature of west African history, as we know it now, for time and events to overlap in a confusing pattern of empire building and empire decay. This next era of Islamic history in west Africa introduces a new empire while continuing the story of empires which began in the centuries before.

a. The Songhai Empire

The 16th century, in the history of the western and central Sudan, was dominated by the Songhai Empire. [76] It became the largest empire ever created in tropical Africa, replacing Mali, and bordered on the east by the Hausa States and to the north and west by Morocco and the Niger River respectively. In a thirty year period, under their greatest leader, Sunni Ali (1464-1492), the Songhai Empire consolidated all of the lesser Savannah states and the remnants of the Mali Empire.

Islam was the great, unsolved, problem of the Songhai Empire. Sunni Ali was a mixer or syncretist. A syncretist attempts to balance the worship of Allah with the

worship of traditional gods. This practice was not accepted by devout Muslims, among them the commander of the Empire's army, General Muhammad. When Sunni Ali's son, Baru, ascended the throne he proved to be more of a mixer than Ali. Muhammad asked that Baru declare himself a Muslim but he refused and in 1493, Muhammad attacked and overthrew Baru, establishing himself as the ruler of Songhai.

"This dispute between pure Muslim and the mixer is very important in the history of west Africa. Anyone who worships any god but Allah is considered a pagan and it is legitimate for pure Muslims to wage Jihad against pagans. Many kings in west African history became Muslims, but in so doing, felt compelled to maintain their role as head of the traditional religions of the state, thereby, preserving the loyalty of all their subjects." [77] It was this attempt to blend Islam and traditional pagan religions which lead to the reformist Jihads of the 19th century.

The Songhai Empire was consolidated under Muhammad who, later, made the pilgrimage (a significant event for west African Islamic leaders). Upon his return he waged Jihad against his neighbors, many of whom were mixers. Eventually, Muhammad conquered the Hausa States and, Islam in a purer form, flourished in the vast Songhai Empire.

In 1590, Morocco invaded the Songhai Empire. There were two practical reasons for this invasion. One, was to gain control of Songhai's lucrative salt trade. The other, was so that Sultan Ahmad, of Morocco, would be able to declare himself leader of the greater part of Islamic Africa through his control of both Morocco and Songhai. From this position, he would be able to press his claim as Caliph, or leader, of the Muslim world. Although the Moroccans captured the capital of Songhai, they were never able to gain firm control of the people. This inability to establish clear control over the Songhai Empire became the source of the modern problem in the western Sahara.

b. Kanem-Borno

During this era the Kanem-Borno empire was heavily troubled by the Hausa States (particularly Kebbi) until the reign of Mai Idris Alooma, who secured the empire's borders and conquered most of the nomadic tribes of the north.

Idris was a great military leader, a skillful administrator, and a devout Muslim. He built many mosques and employed skilled judges to administer the Sharia law. Above all, Idris was most adept at diplomatic relations. Through his skills he was able to play off the two great rivals in North Africa, the Sultan of Morocco and the ruler of the Ottoman Empire. By recognizing the Sultan of Morocco as the supreme head of the Muslim community he held off the Ottoman Turks. When the Sultan conquered Songhai, Kanem-Borno was left as the most powerful state in the Sudan.

c. Hausaland

Kano and Katsina continued to dominate in Hausaland until the early 16th century, when the Hausa States were occupied by the Songhai's. Then, in 1516, the Kanta (king) of Kebbi declared his independence from Songhai and was able to maintain that independence until 1804. By the close of the 16th century Kebbi had gained control over most of Hausaland.

4. Islam in West Africa: 17th - 18th Century

After the Moroccans defeated the Songhai Empire and, as Kanem-Borno began to decline, a period known as the dark ages descended upon west Africa. These dark ages preceded the revolutionary years of the 19th century, when reformist Islamic ideas would be widely spread throughout the region.

Contrary to what the term implies, the dark ages in west Africa were not centuries of chaos. Rather, they represented a period of time when an enormous power vacuum existed. No state emerged to replace the Songhai Empire and most of West Africa was besieged by petty wars and internal disorders. During these dark ages Islam slowly spread into new areas. Islamic learning became more widespread and the pattern of Muslim scholars serving in non-Islamic states continued to influence west African kingdom builders.

By the 18th century West African Muslims had become inspired by Muslim reformist ideas prevalent at the time. From these ideas came the notion of Jihads as a means to perpetrate the spread of Islam. In the 18th century the first two Jihads occurred in Futa Djallon and Futa Toro (in what is now Senegal). The primary importance of these two encounters was as forerunners of the great Jihads of the 19th century, which brought much of west Africa under Muslim control.

Futa Djallon and Futa Toro represent the first successful Jihads led by Fulani Muslim reformists. The Jihad against Futa Djallon began in 1725 and lasted about half a century before Islam was firmly established as the state religion. The Jihad against Futa Toro began in 1776 and was immediately successful; Replacing the non-Muslim leader with an Islamic reformist.

a. Hausaland

As the west African dark ages engulfed Hausaland the power of Kebbi began to wane and the states of Katsina and Gobir emerged as the leading powers. Katsina became a major center of Islamic scholarship and in Gobir the first demands for Islamic reform, in the Hausa States, were sounded. By the end of the 18th century Gobir had emerged as the most powerful Hausa state. Thus, the stage was set for the impending reformist Jihads of the next century.

b. Kanem-Borno

By the end of this era the once great empire of Kanem-Borno had fallen into economic, political, and military decline. The only state in west Africa which could be called Islamic was fading. Throughout this period Islam spread and flourished under the patronage of the Mai's and Kanem-Borno became a center of Islamic learning. [78]

As the 19th century began Kanem-Borno aided the Hausa States against the Jihad forces of the Fulani Reformists. Because of this aide, Kanem-Borno was accused of unbelief and the stage was set here, as in Hausaland, for their eventual overthrow by the Jihadists.

5. Islam in West Africa: 19th Century Reform and Change

"The 19th century was the great century of Islamic expansion in west Africa. In its more remote aspect the reawakening derives from Berber reaction to Arab conquest. Their Islamic zeal thrived on the by-products of Sufism, the religious fraternities, and the cult of saints. The actual expansion was achieved by means of the alliance of the sword and the book. Militant clerics, reacting against the Sudanese accomodation of Islam and paganism, proclaimed the Jihad and found in the theocratic state a unique means for the attainment of power and the subjection to the state of all the diverse elements incorporated in their commonwealths." [79]

The story of 19th century Islamic reform movements, in west Africa, is a story of personalities creating events. It is possible to concentrate on three major Islamic leaders of this era and, thus, gain the flavor and immensity of their accomplishments as well as an appreciation for the rapidity with which Islam can become a major political and cultural force.

a. The Jihads of Uthman dan Fodio

Without doubt, the greatest and most influential of the 19th century Jihad leaders was Uthman dan Fodio. A Fulani cleric from the Hausa state of Gobir, Uthman dan Fodio became disenchanted with the nature of Islam in the central Sudan and invoked the Jihad to institute a reformist Islamic movement.

Avoiding undue aggrandizement, it is nothing short of miraculous that Uthman dan Fodio was able to translate his desires for a reformist Islamic movement into the scope of action that he did. In its simplest form, it may be possible to analyze the success of Uthman dan Fodio based on the factors which motivated him:

1. As a teacher and cleric Uthman dan Fodio had an immediate, near term, goal to rid Gobir and the other Hausa states of pagans.
2. A more encompassing motivation was to purify Islam in west Africa. Stemming from his rejection of rulers who mixed both pagan and Muslim religions, Uthman dan Fodio sought to cleanse Islam of the pagan practices which had been in existence since, at least, the rule of Sunni Ali in the Songhai Empire. It was this motivational tool which was the hardest to rationalize, and once done, the easiest to propagate.

In the strictest interpretation of Islamic law it is forbidden to wage Jihad against other Muslims. However, Uthman dan Fodio happened upon several historically fortuitous events which allowed him to carry off this apparent violation of Islamic law. First, the Muslim communities of Hausaland, essentially Sufi fundamentalists, resented the pagan practices of their rulers. Second, most of the masses resented the oppressions of their rulers and were willing to listen to someone who would lead the attack

against the oppressors. Third, in conjunction with a general, but unspecified belief among Muslims, that the Mahdi will appear at the end of a given century Uthman dan Fodio arose at a most propitious time and, even though he disclaimed rumors that he was the Mahdi, he did claim to be his forerunner.

Having once gained acceptance of the idea that true Muslims were Muslims who acted in accordance with guidelines which were, necessarily, the guidelines of Uthman dan Fodio it was easy to recruit Muslim leaders who sought to foment their own revolutions against pagan overlords.
[80]

3. It is not surprising that the Jihad leaders who solicited the endorsement of Uthman dan Fodio were, themselves, members of the Fulani (Fulbe) ethnic group. In the end, the accomplishment of Uthman dan Fodio was more a creation of a Fulani Islamic empire than the creation of a theocratic state. Because of this Fulani ethnic identity, a frequent motivation espoused for Uthman dan Fodio's Jihads has been the perpetration of a race war to establish Fulani regional dominance.
4. Lastly, the motivation for Jihad was land acquisition and, in conjunction with the Fulani ethnic motivation, it was the acquisition of land to be controlled by Fulani leaders.

The actual conduct of the Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio began in 1804. Declared as, "Commander of the Faithful," Uthman dan Fodio either led or spawned Jihads which, eventually, brought together all of west Africa between the Niger River and Lake Chad. The details of Uthman dan Fodio's campaigns are too numerous for the scope of this paper. However, it is sufficient to note that by 1817, most of what is now northern Nigeria looked to him for direction.

The unification of the vast Hausa states area was accomplished by the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. By 1830 the Sokoto Caliphate had established the frontiers it was to maintain, roughly in tact, throughout the 19th century. [81]

The decline of the Sokoto empire began soon after its inception. Uthman dan Fodio died in 1817 and left the empire under the dual control of his brother and son. Two capitals emerged, the greater in Sokoto and the lesser in Gwandu. Muhammad Bello, Uthman dan Fodio's heir, maintained the unity of the empire from his position in Sokoto and under him education, commerce, and the arts flourished. However, the inherent weakness of an empire with dual control, the inability of Uthman dan Fodio to consolidate his empire prior to his death, incessant raids from northern nomadic tribes, and the ravages of a war torn environment led to the demise of the Caliphate's great influence. Compounding these problems was the fact that the emirs who succeeded those appointed by Uthman dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello became guilty of the same abuses against which the Jihad had been waged.

By 1904, the British occupied Sokoto and put an end to the unrest which had spawned dissent. The Jihad broke down and a period of protracted peace, under colonial domination, resulted in the consolidation of Islamic power and increased Islamic expansion throughout west Africa and, specifically, northern Nigeria.

Uthman dan Fodio's effect on the spread of Islam in west Africa is notable for its scope and purpose. For the first time in west African history Islam became the religion of the people and not just the elites. It was a brand of Islam which, from its inception, was devoid of compromise and yet progressive in its scope. The brand of Islam introduced into west Africa was Sufism, and its concentration on

ritual and mysticism as well as its adaptability to traditional religious practices made it particularly appealing to the communities of west Africa.

Finally, in a narrower sense, the history of Uthman dan Fodio is the history of Nigeria. He consolidated the Hausa States into one Islamic region and set the stage for the Islamic administrations which survived colonization and still exist today. Thus, from the beginning, Islam in Nigeria has been characterized by relatively violent periods of activity which have concentrated on overthrowing oppressive rulers and, only secondarily, establishing Islam as a political and religious institution.

b. The Jihad of Seku Ahmadu

The Jihad of Seku Ahmadu could most closely be termed an independence movement. Seku Ahmadu was a Fulani Muslim who had been inspired by Uthman Dan Fodio and had taken part in the Jihads begun in 1804.

After spending some time fighting with Uthman dan Fodio Seku Ahmadu returned to his homeland of Macina, in central west Africa. He became a dissident in his homeland, speaking out against the pagan practices of the rulers of Macina. He spawned a movement which gained momentum from two sources. One was the traditional Muslim community which wished to see the corrupt practices of their rulers put to an end. The second source was from the Fulani people who lived in Macina. They perceived an opportunity, not only to implement Islamic reform, but to gain independence from the pagan Bambara overlords.

By 1819, after a period of violent turmoil, Seku Ahmadu gained control of Macina. By 1826, he had expanded the borders of his kingdom northeast along the Niger River, to include the trading center of Timbuktu. Within this rapidly expanding empire, Seku Ahmadu devised an efficient

system of administration and imposed a strict Muslim regime upon his people.

Seku Ahmadu died in 1862, leaving to his successors a stable caliphate with a system of government based on traditional Sharia law. However, in the year of his death, after twenty years of stability, the empire of Macina was attacked and conquered by another west African Jihadist, Al-Hajj 'Umar.

c. The Jihad of Al-Hajj Umar

Begun in 1854, the Jihads of Al-Hajj 'Umar were notable for two reasons. First, they were Jihads that clearly resisted the incursions of the French from the west coast of Africa. In this respect, they became the first violent confrontation, in west Africa, between Islam and a colonial power.

Secondly, Al-Hajj 'Umar waged one of his Jihads against the Muslim state of Macina. The motivation for this apparent violation of Muslim law is found in the nature of the type of Islam embraced by Al-Hajj 'Umar. He was a Sufi, belonging to the Tijanniya Brotherhood, an order asserting that its members are spiritually superior to all other Muslims and which encourages the idea that non-members are unbelievers. The Tijanniya Brotherhood contrasted sharply with the Qadiriya Brotherhood, which was the most widespread in west Africa at the time. The Qadiriya order contained most of the Muslim ruling classes within the western Sudan (including the ruling class of Macina) and, they perceived the Tijanniya as a threat to their position [82]

In 1862, Al-Hajj 'Umar attacked the Macina Caliphate. "From the Muslim point of view it was a major tragedy that two Muslim Caliphates, that of 'Umar and Ahmadu, should have clashed when there were non-Muslims close by, [83] who still needed to be brought under Islamic control.

6. Summary

By the end of the 19th century, as a result of the Jihad movements, Islamic states controlled almost all of west Africa. They were states decimated by wars and internal unrest and yet, within this seeming chaos, there existed the state structures necessary for the establishment of sound administrations and efficient political control.

Thus, by the turn of the century, as the colonial powers began their encroachments deeper into west Africa, they found a land fraught with the turmoil of war's aftermath and particularly susceptible to colonial stabilization efforts aimed at consolidation and efficient administration of their empires. This was particularly true of the Nigerian experience.

D. COLONIAL NIGERIA

The Muslim jihads had changed the character of west African states. The Fulani conquests resulted in the collapse of the old Habe dynasties and their replacement with Fulani emirates. The old administrative systems were not entirely removed and many of the traditional positions and titles remained. "It appears clear, however, that the structure of government and administration was modified to conform more closely to the Shari'a, and the Jihad did succeed in setting up an Islamic imamate. This imamate continued until the time of the British administration, and in a modified form was retained under the British system of indirect rule." [84]

As was already pointed out the Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio was social as well as religious. There were economic causes as well as his dislike of the moral problems of oppression and tyranny practiced by the old Habe rulers. However, Uthman dan Fodio's primary concern was social reform in the

context of the Shari'a, "His pre-occupation was not with temporal human welfare, but with the Muslim economy of salvation in relation to the whole Muslim community in the Sudan." [85] Unfortunately, evidence suggests that "reform did not long survive the second generation of Uthman dan Fodio's descendants. The Fulani emirs of the second half of the 19th century had exchanged militant evangelism for mere personal piety and had largely outlived the capacity of the founders to order events and to enforce the change which had been implicit in the Jihad." [86]

J.S. Trimingham points out the ultimate paradox between Uthman dan Fodio's reformist Jihad, the laxity of its second generation emirs, and the intrusion of British colonialism when he states, "Islam enjoyed more favorable conditions for expansion under colonial rule than at any other period of history. During this period of stability Islam not merely consolidated the gains made during the period of theocratic conquerors and states, but also spread far beyond its former confines. European occupation aided this outburst both through the direct action of the administrations and the conditions deriving from that occupation." [87]

"The example of foreign rule offered to Nigerian Muslims during colonial rule revealed that there was an alternative to government under theocratic institutions and that independence and the desired social and economic development could not be maintained by Jihadist revivals. The Muslim way of life could be subjected to change without any offense to the tenets of the religion as expressed in the Qur'an and Sunna. The colonial government generally tolerated and respected Islam where it predominated as the religion of the people and restrained proselytizing by Christian missions in the interest of public security. Orthodox sects were also supported for similar reasons, to discourage the emergence of Mahdism and other movements." [88]

Within this climate the spread of Islam by force of arms was stopped, but it continued to spread by peaceful means engulfing converts at a ratio of about ten to one [89] versus Christianity. This rapid growth of Islam was a direct result of four major factors. One, the isolation of the north specifically precluded the introduction of Christian missionaries. Two, the appeal of Islam, to the pagan peoples of Nigeria had remained constant since its introduction several centuries before. The elements of mysticism and ritual in conjunction with the accepted institution of polygamous marriages widely appealed to the native population. Thirdly, the tenets of Islam remained simple in opposition to the difficult process of training required by the Christians. Lastly, the relative stability of the British colonial administration provided an excellent medium for the growth of Islam. Proselytizing, as a basic tenet of the religion, was made easier within the confines of an administration whose fundamental requirement was the maintenance of order and conflict avoidance. But, as Nigeria progressed towards independence the single most important political entity which began to emerge was the dynamism of ethno-regional politics. Islam, from powerful beginnings, failed to materialize as a viable political force.

E. WHAT IS FUNDAMENTALISM IN NIGERIA TODAY

With the rise of ethno-regional politics and the decline of Islam (as a force for change in Nigeria Islam declined throughout the colonial period) and with the subsequent tumultuous years that followed the declaration of independence: It is somewhat disconcerting to note an increase in the activities of Islamic groups within Nigeria. "The Muslim fundamentalism spreading there is not a purely spiritual matter. The interaction of religion and political power

seems evident. In certain respects - size, demography, and resources - Nigeria is reminiscent of Iran." [90]

In the aftermath of the religious violence of the last two years the spectre of religious intolerance looms at a dangerously high level in Nigeria. "The emotion aroused by the riots provoked a more serious analysis of the Islamic situation in Nigeria. The Yen Izala was only one fundamentalist group in Northern Nigeria and stood out because of their violent methods. The spread of fundamentalism in the last twenty years was directly linked to a certain erosion of traditional authority and the growing seriousness of economic and political problems in Nigeria today." [91]

1. Nigerian Fundamentalism-The Players

The new administrative structures of the federation after the 1966 coup d'etat divided the country into twelve and then nineteen states. This helped create a feeling of Islamic unity which transcended the regional level and rested at the national level. The Association of Moslem students (founded in 1954 and based in Lagos and the south-west since, with over 400 chapters) has insisted that the idea of doctrinal orthodoxy is the only basis for integration.

The federal government acknowledged the student's move towards Islamic unity by creating a Supreme Nigerian Council for Islamic Affairs in 1973. This institution represented the government's attempt to channel the development of Muslim affairs and join political and religious orthodoxy. However, this council's protection was never extensive enough for Nigerian diversity which consisted mainly of the relationship between the continuing authority of the emirs in northern Nigeria and the leadership of the brotherhoods. The brotherhoods had to be eliminated as they appeared to be the greatest obstacles to Muslim integration. There was an

attempt to show the non-Islamic nature of the brotherhoods which could be compared to the work of sects like Maitesine's, whose targets were not only the leaders of the brotherhoods but also traditional leaders of Islam, materialism, and worldliness.

The Anigoluh tribunal noted several conflicts and incidents between the followers of Gummi, Yen Izala, the Moslem Association of Nigeria and other fundamentalists, and the brotherhoods during the 1977-1980 period. The Emir of Kano told the court that, although traditions had been swept away, in general people respect their traditional leaders. In the interest of law and order, the statute on traditional leaders must be restored."

In Nigeria, traditional religious leadership has been integrated with social leadership in modern political structures but fundamentalists there (some of whom want to create an Islamic nation) pose a complex threat to the stability of the current power structure in the north and throughout the federation. The fundamentalists' position is strengthened by the contrast between the obvious materialism and worldliness of the traditional leaders and the attitude of contemporary political leaders who, in the majority, believe in Islam.

Without doubt, poor, oppressed people can be manipulated by clever leaders especially when this manipulation has the bias of the current religious renewal (revival) of Islam, a religion known for its mobilizing power. Nevertheless, the prospect of an Islamic nation in Nigeria seems out of the question because of the divisions between the north, governed by the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy, the southwest by the Yoruba and the east by the Ibos, not to mention the many ethnic minorities. The Constitution of Nigeria stipulates religious freedom, but in the light of recent events, public proselytism has been regulated. It

constitutes a response; an attempt to control the thrust of fundamentalism.

Officially, religious fanaticism is deplored especially when it infringes on the sphere of influence of one party or another. Yet, politically and socially, Nigerian fundamentalism seems to be an extreme response to the intolerable gap between pious, religious and political desires and the country's social realities.

Finally, as Peter D. Clarke of Kings College, London states, "Fundamentalism has been gaining ground in Nigeria in recent years for a number of reasons, one of the main ones being that more people have come to see it as the most useful ideology for a society undergoing considerable, if not profound, dislocation in every sphere, as a result of the rapid pace of industrialization." [92] Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, today, may offer itself as a blueprint for change and a solution for the myriad social, economic, and political problems confronting that nation.

IV. ETHNICITY AND CHANGE

The growth of ethnicity as a powerful force in the political struggle within Nigeria has, at its roots, the colonial policies propagated by Sir Frederick Lugard and fostered by his successors. Chapter Two of this paper is a history of not only the emergence of independent civilian rule in Nigeria but also of the birth and growth of ethno-regional politics.

Within the chronology of Nigeria's eventual rise to self government several significant policies and events highlight the long period of ethnic divergence which has dominated the political tenor of Nigerian government.

Certainly, the premier event in the process of ethno-regional separation within Nigeria was the policy of Indirect Rule perpetrated by British Colonial leaders. More than any single policy this method of government served to divide and isolate the major ethnic divisions within Nigeria and instead of building the foundation for a united Nigeria it lead to a type of tri-regional ossification which has persisted to the present; effectively separating Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba both territorially and ideologically. The development of a sense of national unity gave way to the development of regional powerbases with a corresponding suppression or incorporation of the multifarious minority ethnic groups scattered throughout the three major ethno-political regions.

By far, the largest ethnic grouping is the Hausa-Fulani. Comprised primarily of nomadic tribesmen and converted city dwellers the Hausa-Fulani were the first group affected by Britain's colonial policies and largely through these policies became isolated from the more progressive Ibo and Yoruba ethnic divisions located in the south of Nigeria.

Although large, the Hausa-Fulani were less educated than their southern neighbors and more thoroughly indoctrinated in traditional Muslim religious training. Their system of government was ideally suited to British administrative methods and as their religion grew so to did their broad ethnic base.

Attempts by Britain to bring the Ibo's and Yoruba's under the policy of indirect rule within the construct of the 1914 Amalgamation Plan proved equally destructive to Nigerian national unity and resulted in the enhancement of regional separatism and the evolution of a Nigerian community which shared little in common, other than government by Britain. Characterized by ethnic tension the policy of indirect rule served to undermine the fabric of Nigerian nationalism.

The constitutional evolution within Nigeria's political history, up to the 1979 Constitution, is a history that served to enhance Nigeria's ethnic diversity. The Richards Constitution of 1945 provided the key first step in the development of regional politics by first incorporating the north into the central legislature and then by creating regional councils for the north, east, and west. The creation of these regional councils has been severely criticized as being the foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics.

The follow-on Macpherson Constitution of 1952 further enhanced the regional separatism initiated by the Richards Constitution. As previously stated, the constitutional convention which met to construct the Macpherson document was centered on what type of regional government to adopt and not on creating a strong central administration. The north remained staunchly tied to continued British control while the south pressed for greater self government. It was during this time that the effects of the north's isolation under indirect rule began to emerge as impediments to Nigeria's progress towards national unity and independence.

The follow-on Constitution of 1954 served to strengthen the separatist trend by regionalizing the civil service and the judiciary. Most residual powers were transferred to the three regions and in this fashion Nigeria moved awkwardly into independence carrying with it the central issues of ethno-regional politics.

The culmination, but not the end, of these years of ethnic separatism was the 1967-1970 civil war. It was inevitable that one region should attempt to throw off the cumbersome yoke of an ineffective central government and attempt to create a new state. The threat was grave to the very existence of the entity known as Nigeria. The violence was cataclysmic and the effects are still felt today. But even the resolution of the civil war did not yield a solution to the ethnic politics which dominated Nigeria's political existence.

The ensuing years of military rule leading to the 1979 Constitution and subsequent election were fraught with examples of ethnic tension. However, the new constitution provided a medium in which the continuance of ethno-regional political activity was to be abated. Most certainly, the requirement that the president garner twenty five percent of the vote in two thirds of the states was a dramatic effort to assuage ethnic politics.

Since the inception of the 1979 Constitution several events have transpired to indicate the lessening of ethnic politics in Nigeria. First, the conduct of the 1979 elections (see chapter two, this paper) resulted in a nationally elected president who met the requirements for cross regional election. Ensuing allegations of political gerrymandering notwithstanding, the net result was Nigeria's first nationally elected president. Just as important was the success of the president in maintaining his office through constitutional means and without the aide of a

military all too familiar with the process of running the nation. Ultimately, despite criticisms from opponents, the new system appeared to be working.

A second significant event on the long road to dismember regional politics was the return of Ojukwu, the exiled leader of the Republic of Biafra. Ojukwu's return symbolized several actions. First, it served to symbolically end the civil war which was over but not forgotten. Secondly, it demonstrated the confidence President Shagari felt in his powers as president. Finally, it had the effect of drawing all Nigerians closer as the old wounds created by ethnic diversity and regional politics began to finally heal.

For his part, Ojukwu aided the healing process in several key ways. First, he did not engage in any disruptive rhetoric. Second, he endorsed the policies of President Shagari, a northerner. Finally, he joined the NPN, Shagari's party, and not the Ibo party, while preaching the efficacy of unity within Nigeria.

Thus, the cycle had come full turn. Ojukwu, leader of the rebellious secessionists; defeated, exiled, and returned to a position in the party that was comprised of the northerners he had so despised. It would not be surprising to find Ojukwu on the NPN's next presidential ticket, garnering a wide following from both the northern constituency and his Ibo homeland. He could come to symbolize a truly significant advancement in the demise of ethno-regional politics.

On another front, the drive by many minorities to create new states portends a desire to break-up the old regional hegemonies and provide for a larger political base in Nigeria. Based on proposals submitted in late 1982 to the House and Senate the total number of states in Nigeria would be raised to forty eight. The power of the three traditional regions seems to be waning against the onslaught of the

determined minorities intent on gaining control of their own political destinies.

Finally, the recently completed 1983 elections provide further proof of the survival of the system and the continued atrophy of ethno-regional politics. Shagari was an easy winner, garnering a quarter of the votes in sixteen of the nineteen states. Orderliness was the norm, as violence was relegated to a few isolated incidents. As with the 1979 elections the 1983 elections have been plagued by the attendant allegations of corruption, tampering, and rigging. However, as in 1979, Shagari has answered these questions while maintaining his power, based on the Constitution, and not on the influence of the military or any other non-political force. The end result, although still being weakly contested, seems to be that constitutional government has again successfully met the challenges of an election in Nigeria. With each new victory for the system, the prospects of returning to a system controlled by ethnic rivalries and regional powers seems to grow ever weaker.

V. THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

Nigeria's economy has recovered impressively from the strains imposed by the 1967-70 Civil War. Buoyed by large oil earnings that provide most of the governments revenue and foreign exchange earnings Nigeria has begun working towards economic self-sufficiency.

Oil, by far Nigeria's most important resource, was discovered in 1950. By 1966 nineteen million tons was being produced and in 1970, despite the Civil War, over fifty million tons.

The danger of this oil boom was threefold. One, Nigeria was deprived of manufacture, since most of the oil operation consisted of the export of crude petroleum. Two, the oil boom left the Nigerian economy dependent on outside control. [93]

Three, the Nigerian government became increasingly dependent on the revenues gained from the oil companies with the consequence that it lost control of National economic policy.

Nigeria, after becoming an OPEC member, began to peg its future growth on the prospects of continued oil revenues similar to those experienced in 1973-1974 at the height of the OPEC price increases. Later in this paper the fallacy of an economic policy tied to oil income will be illustrated.

In conjunction with the rapid rise in oil production Nigeria's once prosperous agricultural sector dwindled to below subsistence levels. Prior to the 1973-1974 OPEC price increases Nigeria was a net exporter of agricultural products to include ground-nuts, cocoa, and palm oil. 70 percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture producing 85 percent of the country's exports. As of 1981

Nigeria had completely reversed that trend and had become a major importer of food.

The manufacturing sector centers around primary extraction or processing of export goods, but the manufacture of consumer goods is on the rise. Among the larger industrial operations are cement factories, lumber and plywood mills, three petroleum refineries, and a steel mill.

Of Nigeria's mineral resources only tin, coal, and columbite in addition to petroleum are presently exported. Hard mineral production constitutes a very small portion of the nation's income. Coal, iron, and limestone deposits have resulted in the establishment of an infant steel industry with a promising future.

Nigeria's economic growth, since independence, has been tied to the federal government's development plans. In the first five years after independence (1960-1965) the growth rate of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) at constant prices surpassed the 4-5 percent level which was the average for the preceding decade under colonial rule. However, government spending and private investment had already begun to decline and had slumped to under 3% by the outbreak of civil war in mid 1967.

Generally speaking, the approach to development planning in Nigeria prior to 1970 was characterized by underspending and weak administrative control as reflected in the First National Development Plan (1962-1968). The Second National Development Plan (1970-1974) extended to 1975, emphasized a higher level of agricultural output, rural development, improved infrastructure, and measures to combat unemployment. In the first plan great reliance had been placed on foreign aid with only 20% of public investment financed from domestic sources. Under the second plan this proportion was 80%. Total investment under the second plan was N5,300 million as opposed to a total expenditure in the first plan

of 798 million Nigerian pounds. The growth rate between 1970 and 1974 projected at 7 percent was in fact 8.2 percent per annum in real terms.

The Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) just completed, originally envisaged a total investment of some N30,000 million of which about N20,000 million was to come from public sectors. The plan aimed at an average annual GDP growth rate of 9.1% in real terms with a revised target growth rate of 9.5% in 1979-1980. Additionally, the plan called for an overall GNP per capita increase from N205 to N274 and emphasized rural development and increased food production as well as social services and education. By 1976 the plan had been revised to encourage housing, health and agricultural development. In 1977 revised estimates indicated it would take N42,000 million of investment (up N12,000 million from the original plan) and require N26,500 million in public investment (up N6,500 million) to successfully complete the third National Development Plan.

The Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) forecasts expenditures of N70,500 million and a 42% growth of GDP over five years. Agriculture is given the highest priority, but the plan expects the country to remain dependent on food imports. Mining, including oil, is expected to fall as a proportion of public investment. The Plan has been developed partially in response to the world oil glut and diminishing oil revenues. The impact of oil on the Nigerian economy and the prospects for economic recovery under the Fourth National Development Plan will be discussed next.

A. OIL AND THE FOURTH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Nigeria is a classic example of the oil syndrome. Arising in the mid-1970's, the oil syndrome affliction is a relatively recent phenomenon. The only nations in west

Africa who were established as major oil exporters early enough to develop most of the symptoms are Nigeria and Gabon. Nigeria's pre-oil economy was one of Africa's most vigorous, with real GDP growing at an annual rate of 4.5%. Agriculture was the leading economic sector, as Nigeria was one of the worlds largest exporters of peanuts, palm oil, and cocoa. Nigeria's manufacturing sector had grown from one percent of GDP in 1950, to five percent in 1964. Over the same period, expansion of the money supply averaged about 4 percent. In short, Nigeria's economic prospects seemed encouraging.

Following the 1967-1970 civil war, which decimated Nigeria's manufacturing and agriculture sectors, oil income shot up dramatically, from \$189 million in 1964 to almost \$24 billicn in 1981. The rapid influx of foreign exchange had two immediate and disasterous effects on the Nigerian economy.

1. In order to spread more of the new wealth to urban workers, Nigeria's central bank kept the exchange rate of the dcmeestic currency (naira) unrealistically high.
2. The policy of massive public spending, tempered only by the government's physical ability to organize the handing out of contracts, unleashed a self-perptuating cycle of hyper-inflation.

Consequently, foreign goods became steadily less expensive in naira (N) terms compared to domestic goods, spoiling the markets for domestic producers, driving savings out of the country, and increasing the incentive for smuggling. In this respect, oil allowed Nigeria to multiply its exports in dollar terms by ten times in ten years, and its imports by eleven times.

While oil earnings were rising to claim over 90 percent of Nigeria's total foreign exchange, agriculture and

manufacturing shrank from 58 percent of total GDP in 1964 to 20 percent in 1980. Nigeria, which was once the region's largest food exporter, now has one of the most staggering food production problems in West Africa. Following the sharp increase in government spending in the early 1970s, thousands abandoned farming for higher paying jobs in the cities, and Nigeria plunged from food self-sufficiency to a nation dependent upon over \$2.2 billion in annual imports of rice, frozen chickens, and other foods. To date, all programs initiated by the government to stimulate agriculture have failed because the prices offered to farmers have been significantly less than it cost them to produce their crops and less than they could make by working in town.

Instead of greater economic independence, built on the petroleum bonanza, Nigeria has developed a monocultural dependency and faces the dilemma that it is less self-reliant today than when it became independent 22 years ago. By placing so much emphasis on its oil wealth and by seeking to use that wealth to satisfy the rising level of demands emanating from their country's deeply divided regional and ethnic groups, the actions of Nigeria's political leaders have exacerbated the problems associated with the oil syndrome. Unlike Mexico, Nigeria has not yet begun to mortgage its future by using its oil reserves as collateral for large scale international borrowing to finance growing government expenditures. However, future Nigerian leaders may find this a difficult trap to avoid as societal demands continue to escalate.

The Fourth National Development Plan recognizes the problems caused by the oil syndrome and because over 90 percent of Nigerian export revenues come from oil, the economy presents planners with a tough problem. Slight movements in international markets have proportionally larger impacts on the Nigerian economy. A war in the Middle East

can send export revenues sky high as oil prices rise. A western recession, like the present one, can cut oil demand and drain Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves. In such an unpredictable environment, economic planners must be far-sighted, flexible, and disciplined.

When Nigeria set out its draft for the 1981-1985 development plan, it anticipated that oil production would remain above 2m barrels per day, with exports of about 1.9m bpd, selling at \$36 a barrel. This seemed reasonable at the time as production was running over 2m bpd with a price of \$40 per barrel. The forecast seemed sensible. Then in 1981, the international oil glut struck as Western economies' demand for oil dropped in the face of the recession. By August 1981, production had dropped to 700,000 bpd and Nigeria began to offer concessions to customers. The measure worked and by December 1981 production was back to 1.8m bpd, selling near \$36 per barrel. At that time British oil began to undercut Nigeria's sales and by the end of March 1982 production was down to 630,000 bpd. Nigeria was reduced to a months worth of import cover as the import bill outpaced export revenue by N21,500m per month. The deficit reduced Nigeria's external revenues from N5,767.6m at the end of June 1981 to a little over N1,200m by March 1982.

In March 1982 the Nigerian government reacted by imposing the following import restrictions: 1) suspension of new letters of credit and 'M' forms which are essential for the processing of new import orders. 2) Spare parts and raw materials previously exempted from pre-shipment inspection would now require full inspection. These were interim measures designed to permit the government to examine its economic position and draw up long term plans. In April 1982 the government announced its program. Basically, the government closed all private docks and increased customs surveillance to curb smuggling, recalled all unused import

licenses, suspended issuance of import licenses for various commodities, instituted compulsory advance deposits on all imports, increased the price of gas by 25%, increased interest rates by two percent, increased tariffs by 5-10 percent, and announced stiffer inspection requirements.

These protection measures drew much international criticism but Nigeria has announced that as a result of these measures balance of payments should show a surplus by the end of 1983. Although foreign exchange reserves at the end of May 1982 stood at just over N740m, only sufficient to cover two week imports at the pre-restriction levels, the downward spiral is under control while the level of imports is expected to drop from pre-restriction levels of N1,200m to N800m per month.

Another response to Nigeria's oil revenue shortfall problem was its program of foreign borrowing and revenue raising. Though Nigeria declined Saudi Arabia's offer of \$1 billion it did draw \$740 million from the IMF to support its reserves. A \$217m loan was signed with London for internal projects and an \$80 million dollar Euromarket loan was financed by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company to build a polypropylene plant.

In June 1982 oil production began to recover. It hit its highest level since January 1982, at 1.65m bpd and appeared to be on course for an average production of 1.3m bpd for 1982 which would equal the OPEC quota allocated to Nigeria. Unfortunately, oil exports continued to decline and Nigerian production fell below 1m bpd. OPEC refused to lower its prices which were generally running at \$35.00 per barrel by the end of 1982. The final straw was the influx of North Sea oil onto an already glutted market, at \$30.00 per barrel.

By February 1983, Nigeria was forced to lower its oil prices despite OPEC protests. This move can only be viewed, in hindsight, as an act of economic survival and cannot be

construed as an attempt by Nigeria to foster a role as an OPEC dissident.

By mid 1983, Nigeria's price cuts had the desired effect of raising demand for its high quality crude and production returned to the OPEC minimum requirement of 1.3m bpd. However, at \$30.00 per barrel this production figure will continue to greatly hamper Nigerian efforts for development as outlined in the Fourth National Development Plan.

The 1983 oil crisis reinforced Nigeria's need to diversify and the 1981-1985 development plan makes this need a top priority. The following is a run-down of the salient points of the development plan:

1. Industry - Both manufacturing and construction have grown rapidly since independence. Despite this growth, manufacturing still accounts for a relatively small proportion of GDP (6% in 1979-1980), although construction accounts for about 13 percent of the GDP. Production is mainly of importing substituting consumer goods and takes place behind a screen of protectionist policies. Greater emphasis is now being placed on consumer durables such as cars, capital goods, and heavy industries such as steel and petro-chemicals.

The textile industry has been the most important manufacturing sector but has suffered recently from smuggled imports. Rubber, brewing, aluminum, and tin products (to name a few) are also important. A pulp and paper mill is being established in conjunction with a newsprint factory. In March 1979, Leyland Nigeria, opened its first domestic vehicle assembly plant with another opening occurring in 1980. By 1984 five more vehicle assembly plants, owned by various corporations, are scheduled for opening.

By 1985 Nigeria is expected to require in excess of 4m tons of steel. An iron and steel industry is being

established now, to cope with this expected demand. With aid from the USSR, Nigeria plans to have its own plant by 1983.

The 1972 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, extended and strengthened in 1976 involves three categories of firms. Schedule I must be 100% Nigerian owned and includes most small businesses. Schedule II must be 60% Nigerian owned and includes banking, insurance, construction industries, and mining. Schedule III (since 1979) includes agri-businesses and food production companies and must be 40% Nigerian owned. Currently this decree is being selectively relaxed to encourage foreign private investment in neglected sectors, such as large scale agriculture.

The Fourth National Development Plan expects industry to grow by at least 15% per year, up from the 25% annual growth in 1979 and 1980. To assist in manufacturing, the direct investment in industrial development will concentrate on creating the basic industries that can provide inputs for manufacturers. Agribased industries are to receive special attention.

2. Mining - The share of mining in the GDP has been rising rapidly over the last decade and equalled 25 percent in 1978-1979. The mineral commodities vary from the alluvial gold deposits in the west and the tin mines in the north to the coal, lead, zinc and petroleum deposits in the east, midwest and continental shelf.

The production of crude petroleum, which was first discovered in Nigeria in 1956, increased rapidly from 13.3m tons in 1965 to 111.6m tons in 1974. Since then the level of production has varied widely, according to the state of the world market. Average liftings reached 2.25m bpd in 1974 but then slumped to 1.56m bpd in the first half of 1975, owing to slack demand. Thereafter, production rose, only to fall again in 1978. There was a recovery in 1979,

with production reaching a record average of 2.4m bpd in the first half of the year, but in 1981 the industry hit the worst trough of all, and output slumped to 600,000 bpd at one point. A partial recovery at the end of the year gave way to a new slump in early 1982. These peaks and troughs have been related to OPEC price increases. During 1979 and 1980 Nigeria increased the price of oil several times, in line with OPEC policy. In March 1982 the price of Nigerian light was \$36.50 per barrel, putting it at the top of the OPEC scale.

Production costs for Nigerian oil are three to seven times as much as in the Middle East, but it has an exceptionally low sulphur content. In the first half of 1981 Nigeria was the sixth largest producer of crude oil in the world, and the largest in Africa, accounting for about 3% of total world production. Its proven reserves amount to about twenty years at the current lift rate, but new finds could raise total reserves to as much as 50,000m barrels. The U.S. is the main customer for Nigeria's oil taking more than one-third of exports. The Netherlands and France are also important customers.

Until 1964 the entire output of Nigeria's crude oil was exported. With the completion and operation of the 60,000 barrels-a-day refinery at Port Harcourt in 1965 a small proportion of the crude oil production started to be refined in country. A second oil refinery at Warri in Bendel State, went on stream in September 1978, and now produces 100,000 bpd. It is wholly owned by the NNPC. A third refinery with a daily capacity of 100,000 bpd has been built in Kaduna and was commissioned in 1980. A fourth refinery is now planned. With demand increasing by 25% annually, Nigeria suffers shortages of refined products. A network of pipelines is being built, for transporting refined products from Warri for distribution in the north, and for transporting crude

from the coast to the refinery in Kaduna. The first section, from Warri to Kaduna, was completed in 1978. In December 1979, the federal government nationalized the U.S. owned Esso Standard company and used it as a distribution organ.

The prospects for mining natural gas appear bright with proven reserves totalling 2,125m cubic meters but, at present, only about 10% of the gas produced is used, while the rest is flared off. There were plans to build a gas liquefaction plant, with a daily capacity of at least 1,600m cubic feet. For this project, a company called Bonny LNG was set-up in 1978. The NNPC owned 69% of its shares with the rest distributed among various foreign investors. In February 1980 a twenty year supply agreement was signed with a European consortium for 800m cubic feet per day, starting in 1984. The viability of the project depends on the sale of a further 800m cubic feet per day to four US distributors. Negotiations with the US government broke down in 1980. A further setback occurred in 1981 when the outline of the government's 1981-1985 development plan deferred major public expenditure on the project until the second half of the decade. In consequence, the Bonny LNG consortium temporarily broke up.

Coal was the first commercial energy source to be exploited in Nigeria. It has been produced in Eastern Nigeria since 1915. From then until 1959 production increased gradually to a peak of 900,000 tons. With reduction in demand, production fell steadily to 237,000 tons in 1975. It rallied to 565,000 tons by 1977 but then continued its downward trend, falling to 155,477 tons in 1980. The coal industry is undergoing reorganization to raise productivity. Capacity of the two mines operated by the Nigerian Coal Corporation is estimated at one million tons per year.

Other minerals include tin ore, columbite, lead, gold, zinc, tungsten, marble, lignite and limestone. Reserves of

iron ore discovered at Itakpe in Kwara State are estimated at 86-105 million tons and are expected to form the basis of Nigeria's future iron and steel industry. Until the discovery of petroleum the tin industry on the Jos Plateau formed the backbone of the country's mining industry. Almost all the tin ore is smelted locally at Jos. Production of tin concentrates declined from a peak of 13,240 metric tons in 1968 to 2,530 metric tons in 1980. Tin deposits in Kano State are to be exploited in a N25m project which is expected to raise tin output substantially. Nigeria is the leading producer of columbite, supplying approximately 95% of the world's industrial requirements. Production of columbite was 1,312 metric tons in 1975 but only 550 metric tons in 1979.

Apart from the oil industry, the government (in the Fourth National Development Plan) plans to develop Nigeria's natural gas reserves. Nigeria will also begin to develop its own petrochemical industry to begin meeting internal requirements. Additionally, a steel production capacity is expected to develop within the decade.

3. Agriculture - Agriculture was the most important sector of the Nigerian economy until the 1960's when the central stimulus of growth in the Nigerian economy began to shift. Since the civil war, agriculture has been completely overtaken by the petroleum industry as the engine of growth. Agriculture (together with livestock, forestry, and fishing) contributed about 61.2% of the GDP at current factor costs in 1962. By 1980 its contribution had declined to 21%. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector continues to be of crucial importance in providing employment for over half of Nigeria's total workforce, food to meet the needs of an increasing population, and raw materials for the expanding

industrial sector. The government has introduced a number of measures to increase both private investment (including foreign investment) and foreign aid in the sector. The Federal Government will bear up to 40% of the cost of private sector agri-projects and hopes to attract the interest of US investors. Currently, the World Bank is assisting a national food plan.

Agricultural products constituted about four-fifths of the total value of exports in 1960. By 1970, however, their value had dropped to 44% of total export earnings, and in 1978-1979 they had accounted for only 6% of the total. This decline as a proportion of total value of exports is due not only to the spectacular growth of crude oil exports but also to the poor performance of the agricultural sector resulting from drought, low producer prices, and the competition for skills and labor from other sectors of the economy, primarily oil related industries.

The main agricultural commodities in the commercial sector used to be cocoa, groundnuts and groundnut oil, palm kernels, rubber, cotton and cottonseed, palm oil and timber. Now, cocoa is the only agricultural export of any significance. Until 1973 Nigeria was the world's second largest producer of cocoa (after Ghana) but it now produces only about 11% of the world total. World prices fell heavily in 1980 when the International Cocoa Agreement broke up. The decline continued in 1981 and by November prices were about 7% below the level of the previous year. In 1977-1978 the harvest improved to 202,000 tons, from 165,000 tons in the previous year, but fell to only 117,000 tons in 1978-1979. In 1979-1980 production rose again to 176,000 tons but was back down to 155,000 tons in 1981. Under a rehabilitation scheme sponsored by the World Bank, new plantations have been established in the Western States with new high yield trees.

Groundnuts are grown mainly in the north, on peasant holdings. Until 1972 Nigeria was Africa's leading groundnut producer, with an annual crop of between 1.5m and 2m tons. Since 1973, however, output has been extremely low, for various reasons: drought, pests, viruses, smuggling, and switching land to yams and maize for local consumption. No groundnuts have been exported since 1975 and local crops are milled at village presses. In 1980 production had fallen to 377,000 tons, down almost 50% from the previous year.

Cotton output picked up in the mid-1970's with the ending of drought conditions in the north where 90% of Nigerian cotton is grown. Between 1974 and 1977 cotton rose from 30,000 tons to 81,000 tons, and ranked Nigeria third among African producers. By 1979 output had fallen to 41,000 tons and presently, Nigeria cannot meet its demand for the domestic textile industry.

Production of palm produce has been steadily declining in recent years. Improved producer prices helped to raise output of palm kernels by 15% in 1978 and by another 5% in 1979, but Nigeria has now become an importer of palm oil. Government aid is scheduled for this section of agriculture through a plantation rehabilitation program.

Nigeria is the second largest rubber producer in Africa. 90% of its output comes from smallholdings, although large scale plantation projects are being encouraged. Production is increasingly being absorbed by domestic tire and footwear industries and exports are now very small.

Subsistence food crops (mainly maize, sorghum, taro, yams, cassava, rice and millet) are generally cultivated in conjunction with and in the same area as crops for local and export use. Nigeria also grows sugar cane, coffee, beans, peas, wheat, sesame seed, bananas, tea, oranges and other citrus fruits. Soya bean production is being revived with investments of N100m scheduled. Sugar cane production is

also being stimulated but progress on the government's ambitious expansion programs has been slow, and domestically produced sugar is expensive. It is impossible to make an accurate measurement of subsistence output. The peasant mode of production, characterized by smallholdings, simple techniques, and bush fallow system of cultivation, is certainly the basis of the Nigerian agricultural system for both export and domestic commodities. Besides the peasant farm units there are new forms of farm organization which increasingly constitute the growing points of the sector, to include plantations and farm settlement schemes. The one positive note is that Nigeria is largely self-sufficient in meat products and it exports hides and skins. A project for tsetse fly eradication in the south is under way and a program for livestock improvement has been approved.

Nigerian agriculture was growing at an average annual rate of 7.8% between 1970 and 1974, but by 1976 this growth had declined to only one percent, recovering slightly to 4.2% in 1978-1979 (against overall growth of 5.5%). The sector is seriously ailing, with a dramatic decline in most export crops and the food import bill soaring. The government recognizes that there is an urgent need to modernize techniques and increase yields, and also to close the rapidly widening gap between farmer's income and urban wages. A number of large scale agricultural development projects have been started which are aimed at producing much needed food crops like rice and wheat as well as cotton for industry. Nine river basin authorities were established in 1976 to supervise these and other schemes, to develop integrated agricultural development, set up agro-industries, reclaim land, and improve productivity. They involve small farmers as well as large commercial businesses. There is a single price fixing authority and seven commodity boards, which cover cocoa, groundnuts, cotton, palm produce, rubber,

grains, and rootcrops. These boards are responsible for organizing, on a national basis, the marketing of food and cash crops for local consumption and processing, and for guaranteeing local prices to farmers. Producer prices were increased by 16-20% in 1979 and between 12-74% (depending on the crop) in 1980. Improved credit facilities are available to the farmers, agricultural companies and co-operatives, through the Nigerian Agricultural Bank. An agricultural credit guarantee scheme encourages commercial banks to make more credit and loans available to the agricultural sector. In 1976 "Operation Feed the Nation", aimed at increasing domestic food production, which is falling well behind demand, with massive quantities of agricultural inputs at heavily subsidized prices and at encouraging as many individuals and institutions as possible to become involved in the growing of food. In January 1980 a short term N18m 'crash program' was introduced to boost output of crops, livestock, and fisheries. The "Operation Feed the Nation" scheme was abolished and a "National Council on the Green Revolution" established.

The Fourth National Development Plan allocates 13% of total public investment to agriculture. It estimates that output would have to increase by 6.5% annually to keep pace with demand, but does not foresee any likelihood that this rate can be obtained. Instead it aims for a 4% annual growth rate, up from its present one percent rate.

4. Infrastructure - A significant portion of the Fourth National Development Plan deals with the development of improved infrastructure in Nigeria. Briefly, the plan allocates N2.4 billion to the development of power supplies. Two hydro-electric stations are to be established along with a thermal plant. In the field of transport, the emphasis is more on maintenance than on new construction, except in the rural areas

where roads have not yet been built. N2 billion is to be spent on communications. This is to maintain and improve existing facilities and add new telephone and telex lines.

The 1981-1985 Development Plan is clearly designed to widen Nigeria's economic base. In 1981 the government highlighted its determination to reduce dependence on the oil industry and rejuvenate agriculture, by moving agri-business ventures from schedule II to schedule III of the Indigenisation Decree. This reduces required local participation in agribusiness concerns from 60 percent to 40 percent. The indigenisation relaxation, particularly as it affects agriculture, should help stimulate the non-oil sectors of Nigeria's economy and lead to more balanced growth.

Nigeria's awareness of the role of the private sector in the drive towards economic diversification has also been highlighted by the Ministry of Industries investment promotion campaign. American enterprises showed particular interest and as part of Nigeria's effort to promote greater US investments special attention was given to the implementation of the Investment Guarantee Agreement concluded between Nigeria and the US in 1974. As part of the same drive, arrangements have been concluded to establish two investment liaison offices in the US.

Overall, the events of the last year show that the Nigerian government appreciates the role of foreign investment in the economy, is learning to cope with the economic crisis caused by the country's monocultural dependence on oil and oil revenues, and is making progress on diversifying the economic base so that Nigeria's economic stability will no longer be dependent upon the tempo of the international oil market.

E. TRADE

In August 1977 Nigeria's trade balance went into deficit for the first time since the oil boom of 1974. There was, however, a surplus of N1,050m for the whole year but this represented a sharp fall from the N4,058m surplus of 1974. The value of merchandise exports rose from N271.6m in 1959 to N5,795m in 1974, with the rapid rise of petroleum earnings. In 1980 total exports were an estimated N14,077m while the import bill (N358.8m in 1959) had reached an estimated N9,658m. In years of high oil production, the balance of trade is in surplus, but when production slumps exports may fall below imports, which explains the trade deficit in 1978. Under the 1978-1979 budget, strict import controls (pg.6, para 2) were introduced. These were continued in the 1979-1980 budget. Additionally, pre-shipment inspection of quality and price of imports is undertaken to curb overinvoicing by importers as a means of moving cash out of the country. The effect of these controls and the resurgence of exports was to produce a surplus in 1980. In 1981, however, exports once again dipped far below imports (tied to the world oil glut).

The growth of petroleum exports has contributed significantly to the change in the structure of exports. In 1959 four traditional commodities - cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil, and palm kernels contributed about 70% of total exports, while petroleum contributed only 1.7%. The share of crude petroleum rose to 25.9 percent in 1965 and is now well over 90 percent.

There have also been important changes in the structure of imports. The share of capital goods and raw materials has risen from 46% in 1959 to about 70% of the total import bill, reflecting the rapid rise of manufacturing industries and the increased demand for heavy equipment generated by

capital projects, as well as the growing oil industry. Consumer durables now account for less than 9% of imports while foodstuffs make up as high as 20%.

The significant changes in the direction of international trade since 1959 have been the decreasing share of the United Kingdom in both import and export trades of Nigeria and the corresponding increase in the share of the EEC countries. Oil purchases by the US have grown so much that it is now Nigeria's largest trading partner (replacing the UK). US imports by 1980 represented 46% of Nigeria's total exports. The US is followed by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the Netherlands, each with 12% of 1980 exports. The UK is still Nigeria's main supplier, with 19% of all imports in 1980 (compared with 45.3% in 1959) and is followed by the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, France, and the US with 12, 10, 9 and 8 percent respectively. Nigeria is a member and founder of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

C. PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

In 1981 the financial year was changed from April-March to run concurrently with the calendar year, and the period from April to December was covered with a nine month interim budget. The 1981 estimates foresaw total federally collected revenue of N14,745m, recurrent expenditure of N4,847.7m, and federal capital expenditure of N7,154.1m. The capital program was to be financed largely from the recurrent budget surplus, internal, and external loans, leaving a budget deficit of N1,227m. Some 13% of capital spending was earmarked for the agricultural sector and 21% for industry. In view of the 1981 oil slump, the 1982 budget was restrictive.

In January 1973, a system of decimal currency was introduced with the naira (N) replacing the Nigerian pound. The naira, equalling ten old Nigerian shillings, is divided into 100 units called kobo. The naira devalued against gold by 10 percent following the devaluation of the US dollar in February 1973. The currency has been floating since April 1974.

Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves shot up to \$6,446m by April 1975, compared with \$292m at the end of 1972. The increase was the result of the rise in oil revenues. Lower oil output led to a fall in foreign exchange reserves and by September 1978 they stood at only \$960m, less than one month's import cover. They recovered during 1979, with higher oil prices, and by September 1980 stood at \$9,766m. Foreign exchange reserves slumped drastically in 1981 and were down to \$3,097m by the end of the year.

Nigeria's balance of payments, which showed an overall surplus of N125m in 1975 and of N3,102m in 1974, went into deficit in 1976, 1977 and 1978, at the end of which year the deficit on the current account was \$3,786m and the overall deficit \$2,344m. Vastly improved oil revenues contributed to a current surplus of \$1,676m in 1979, rising to \$2,915m in 1980.

As part of a proposed borrowing program to help finance capital spending, Nigeria negotiated a \$1,000m seven year loan on the Euromarket in January 1978, the largest Eurolcan ever obtained by an African country. In July 1978 Nigeria sought a second \$1,000m Eurolcan. This proved more difficult to obtain because of the deterioration in the balance of payments and the fact that the international banking community no longer regarded Nigeria as a first class borrower. Finally, late in 1978, it obtained a \$750m loan from a consortium of 73 international banks and in February 1979 a loan agreement for \$1,126m was signed with a

consortium of Federal German and Austrian banks, for the Warri steel project. The Warri loan was eventually incorporated into the untied \$759m loan package, to which the international banks involved in the latter agreement added a further \$200m, preferring to lend when there was a "tied" element to the package.

The cost of external public debt servicing estimated in the 1979-1980 budget was N358.3m, still very low in relation to exports.

D. FUTURE PROSPECTS

Nigeria's economy has been growing rapidly, mainly due to the oil boom. Nevertheless, there was a definite downturn in the economy during 1975-1976, 1978-1979, and in 1982-1983 as oil revenues fell. The earlier rise in oil revenues had encouraged a sharp rise in government spending and of liquidity which, together with transport bottlenecks and large wage increases, combined to produce a high rate of inflation. The boom had also led to soaring imports, particularly of luxury goods. Another contributory factor to inflation is the cost of maintaining the army with a projected budget over the next five years of \$6.2 billion, however, large scale demobilization would result in raising the already dangerously high unemployment level and could lead to political instability.

GDP grew in real terms by 25% between 1976-1977 and 1979-1980. At 1973-1974 prices, it totalled N14,992.5m in 1976-1977 prices, rose by 8.6% to N16,285.2m the following year, increased only slowly in 1978-1979 (reflecting oil slumps) to N17,182.2m and reached N18,740.4m in 1979-1980. Inflation has been in double figures throughout this period and was particularly high in 1977-1978, when it reached 30-40%. Inflation is currently fluctuating between 10-20%.

The civilian government inherited a reasonably healthy economy, as a result not only of the huge rise in oil revenues but also of the military Government's austerity measures and strenuous efforts to improve the management of the economy. It has to date continued its predecessor's economic policies although it has increased the emphasis on agriculture and is reviewing import curbs and the wage freeze now in existence. The latter has been replaced by 'guidelines for a return to free collective bargaining', with wage increases linked to increases in productivity. The minimum monthly salary has been raised to N125. Import restrictions were lifted on certain items, and the Price Control Board was replaced by a more flexible and effective body, the Price Intelligence Agency. However, the 1981 oil slump led to a series of strict controls and in April 1982 restrictions were imposed on the import of goods which are also manufactured on a significant scale in Nigeria. The government was to review all capital projects not already started and domestic interest rates were increased by 2%.

Nigeria is facing a serious economic crisis. Capital investment and development are inextricably intertwined with oil exports and the ever-changing revenue inflow that monocultural dependency can lead to. The Fourth National Development Plan has recognized the uncertainties of Nigeria's economic future and has laid the groundwork for diversification and increasing protectionist policies. As a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa and the key country in the stability of West Africa the success of Nigeria in the next five years will be critical to regional growth and development. [94]

VI. CONCLUSION

Nigeria in its diversity, presents many opportunities for examination. Its size, relative wealth, and importance to African stability make Nigeria a target for a myriad amount of speculation, primarily concerning its potential demise.

Since the Civil War Nigeria has steadily developed, by trial and error, into a dominant and relatively stable force in regional and continental economics and politics. While examining those areas which may create future change it is imperative not to forget the strength Nigeria has displayed in its political evolution, military preparedness, and economic opportunism. Although still faced with many difficulties in the future it must be remembered that Nigeria has developed a strong working constitution which has yielded two successful national elections and, despite an oil sensitive economy, has continued to persevere in its adherence to a thorough, if not overly ambitious, economic plan.

But problems do exist in Nigeria. In large part these problems are due to a wide ranging cultural diversity and a turbulent political history which has been manifest in a violent, often chaotic, fashion resulting in a history rife with Jihad, coups, and civil war.

The intent of this paper has been to present certain facets of Nigerian society today which might drive future change. Three areas; Islam, ethnicity, and economics were chosen as the most probable sources of future discontent and the most likely vehicles for initiating some form of change. Which of these areas may become the medium for change will be discussed next.

A. ISLAM

Although largely termed a fundamentalist movement, the Islam of Nigeria strongly resembles revivalist movements prevalent in other countries with large Muslim populations. The emergence of Islam as an alternative revolutionary model to more secular socialist or nationalist models necessitates greater understanding of the complexities of Islam and its impact on society as well as its significance as a way of life both politically and culturally for over 750 million Muslims in 47 countries. Understanding the dynamics of Islamic revivalist movements can assist in accurately judging their scope, character, and impact.

1. Revivalism - A Course for Change

On January 16, 1979, the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was forced from his throne and country for the second, and last time. What had begun, in earnest, fourteen months before [95] culminated in the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile and his vow to institute an Islamic republic. The fourteen months between 1977 and 1979 can be seen as a transformative event. Shi'ite preaching had been honed into an effective technique for maintaining a high level of consciousness about the injustice of the Pahlavi regime. As the various sectors of society increasingly felt their interests take second priority to those of the industrial world, pressure against the government grew. As the Iranian government, increasingly, came to rely on foreigners (primarily U.S.) both for labor and technical advice, one group after another was alienated and embittered. The voice of the opposition became that of Islam. The demand was for the shah's removal and a reordering of the national priorities. Thus, "The causes of the revolution, and its timing, were economic and political; the form of the revolution, and

its pacing, owed much to the tradition of religious protest." [96]

"Historically, the most important consequence of the revolution may prove to be the rise of religion as a significant international political force. Blending theocratic ideology with mob power on a sustained basis offers an alternative revolutionary model to supplement Marxist and other paradigms. It is a way to replace the authority and legitimacy of a monarch or other secular leader with another kind of power based on a different justification. Tactically, it accomplishes its aim without resorting to massive sustained violence. In this case the fundamentalists proved that even a powerful armed force can be destroyed from within. The most disturbing element about Khomeini's Islamic movement was not its doctrine but its effective mobilization of a diverse society into a political organization supporting a religious government. Clerical supremacy as asserted by Khomeini, is an implicit standing challenge to secular governments everywhere." [97]

The Iranian Revolution is, perhaps, the most dramatic episode in a series of episodes which mark a notable increase in the activities and influence of Muslim organizations. [98] This phenomenon, which M.E. Yapp, a noted Islamic scholar, has termed contemporary Islamic revivalism represents the widespread rejection of the secularist (inherently Western) path of historical development and is not just a matter of a few episodes which can be explained as special events.

How do we explain Islamic revivalism and what constitutes the basis for a revivalist movement? These two questions must be answered if we are to understand the forces which are driving the modern Islamic world, and if we are to attempt to anticipate similar episodes in the future. Therefore, finding a satisfactory explanation for the

phenomenon of Islamic revivalism is a matter of practical importance.

Several explanations have been advanced. The phenomenon has been explained in terms of the peculiarities of Islam, its primitive nature and its association with early empires. It has been argued that the nature of the geographical environment in which Islam arose and the important role played by nomadic pastoralists in its history and their relations with towns has stimulated social and political behavior of a character unlike that of other systems. The egalitarian character of Islam seems to have made a suitable vehicle for the radical enthusiasms of modern men. Another interpretation has been in terms of a distinctive reaction to the West. It has been argued that the Muslim world suffered longer and more profoundly from the Western intrusion than did other civilizations. The phenomenon has also been accounted for by reference to the concept of the rejection of intellectuals, that is that Muslims who sought to become assimilated to the West found themselves spurned and in disgust angrily returned to their own traditions. It has also been suggested that the apparent deficiencies of Western political, economic, social and intellectual systems have induced Muslims to look back to the sources of Islam for an alternative model. Other explanations center around the discovery of oil in the least developed Muslim countries, and the desire of other Muslims to adopt a more orthodox demeanor to gain favor with these oil producing nations. Finally, Muslim revivalism has been explained as an opportunity for unpopular rulers to deflect criticism by inducing piety.

These explanations possess some elements of truth, but none seems comprehensive enough to account for the character and the extent of the Muslim Revivalist movement. This paper subscribes to the explanation that Muslim revivalism

is a result of the process of modernization as distinguishable from westernization, two terms which seem to be used interchangeably.

a. The Westernization of Islam

Inherently bound up in the Islamic revivalist movements is the notion of Westernization and Western intrusion. The Western intrusion of Islam existed well before the contemporary Muslim movements and well before the process of modernization.

The encounter between the West and Islam began with the rise of Islam. For a thousand years Islam had the best of exchanges with Europe, but in the 17th century the tide began to turn and, since the 18th century, the Europeans have made considerable advances at the expense of the Muslims. Conquest, political influence, economic investment, and intellectual dominance have marked the path of Western progress. With this passage of Western culture into the Muslim world also came the European missionaries, endeavoring to replace Islam with Christianity.

Muslim reaction to this Western intrusion took three basic forms:

1. Muslims who were primarily impressed by the political threat posed by Europe proposed to remodel their institutions in a Western manner. The Ottoman reformers were an example of this form of reaction. In attempting to remodel their institutions they effectively adopted the first process in the Western concept of secularization - Islam lost its public function and became a system of personal belief. In many Muslim states armies became the focus of this reformist movement and were the leading promoters of a more secularist pattern.

2. The second reaction was one of outright rejection. This was the attitude of both orthodox ulema and Sufi orders everywhere. For the most part this rejection asserted that the institutions of Islam were derived from God and could not be changed. It was a non-violent rejection except in certain areas where violent opposition arose to counter modernizing Muslim governments. The violent episodes, it seems, frequently took place in the remoter areas of the Islamic world. [99] It was in the remoter areas that Islam waged its battle on two fronts. First, to the West, Islam presented a negative force opposing the spread of Christianity. Secondly, to pagans located in the remote areas of Africa and the Middle East, it offered an attractive model of political and social organization. It was on the second front that Islam made its greatest gains at the expense of the West.
3. The third reaction was that of compromise. It is associated with the Islamic modernists, a name given to various individuals and groups who have sought to reconcile Islam with modernity. In appearance, Islamic modernism seemed to graft Western processes on to the Islamic Shari'a (code of law). It served to reconcile both Islam and Western modernization and Islam and customary law. The weakness of Islamic modernism was that the greater the inroads which it made into Muslim institutions the more it appeared as an Islamic cover on a Western model. To those Muslims who rejected all forms of Western influence it became more and more difficult to avoid confrontations.

b. The Impact of Modernization

A distinctive feature of all these reactions was their limitation to elite groups. [100] The mass of the

people in the Muslim world were little affected by the Western intrusion and continued to lead a life that was changed very slightly by the events occurring around them. "The alteration in the lives of the masses came in consequence of the modernization process of the later 20th century rather than as a result of the Western impact of the 19th and early 20th century." [101]

Modernization in the Muslim world took a characteristic form. Politically, it was marked by an increase in the power of government. Economically, it was heralded by the decline in the relative importance of agriculture, the rise of industry and services, and the shift of people from countryside to towns. Socially, it was exhibited in the proliferation of communications, the growth of mass education and the weakening of the traditional compartmentalization of society. Modernization resulted in an increase in population and a growing internal and external threat to the states. The principal agencies of modernization were the states themselves and, "It was modernization, most conspicuously in the form of urbanization, which involved the masses and led to the formation of a reaction different from those of the 19th and early 20th century elites. Therefore, in response to the question, "Is the phenomenon of contemporary Muslim revivalism new?" The answer is yes. The involvement of the masses in politics via modernization is an unprecedented event in the Islamic world." [102] This response gives rise to a second question, "In what ways has the involvement of the masses changed the character of political life in Muslim countries? The answer is that the participation of the masses in political life, in the Muslim world, has tended to make politics more Islamic." [103]

Traditional Islam was seen as a synthesis of religion and politics. Modernization destroyed the traditional divisions between politics and religion by assuming

the functions previously relegated to the ulama. This encroachment upon the power of the ulama by the government, resulted in a confrontation between church and state. Initially, the ulama wished only to regain the authority which the government had usurped. Later, they wanted to control the very apparatus of state. As Yapp states, "The effect of the first stage of secularization (the transfer of the public functions of religion to the state) was to politicize religion." [104]

The consequence of this politicization of religion was the organization of the ulama into various pressure groups to gain or regain their traditional functions and to represent religion in the governmental decision making process. The ulama quickly learned that their power and often their income were dependent upon the apparatus of state and their aim was to control that state.

The process of modernization also affected the attitudes of the masses. In traditional societies they felt little compulsion to achieve a political identity because such identities had little impact on a situation where power was so widely dispersed through society. Modernization, "Represented especially by the concentration of political power in the hands of the state, and by urbanization, obliged the masses to choose a political identity: in Muslim countries the choice of the masses has often been a Muslim identity. The Muslim identity is, perhaps, the single identity which is transferable from the traditional, rural environment, to the modern urban situation and, therefore, of peculiar significance to the new urban immigrant." [105]

As modernization proceeds, the new urban immigrant becomes more involved in the political process via schools, courts, economic activity, the army, or improved communications. With increased involvement comes an increased desire to shape the environment within which they

earn their livelihood. Frequently, these desires manifest themselves in the form of demands or assertions, that the Westernized elite have forsaken the values of Islam, and that if they had followed the traditional path of behavior there would be a more equitable distribution of rewards and power. Most of these politically active masses have an unclear picture of the exact nature of the type of Islamic government they want. They are equally confused about the role of the ulama in the government. They are unsure whether ulama should be watchdogs over government or participants in it. For the most part these masses, which form the Muslim revivalist parties, are more concerned with practical action than with philosophical consistency, *viv a vis*, Shari'a law.

c. Revivalist Movements

"The differences between the new parties or movements of Muslim revivalism and former groups are striking. The new parties are movements of the masses, not the elites. They are composed of new urban men, not tribal or agrarian or old bazaar men, although the last provide useful support. Their leaders are not normally from the traditional elites. The movements are uncompromisingly modernist. Unlike the older modernists, they are essentially political movements, not social, and they are not concerned with intellectual compromise; they are strictly traditional in their formulations and modern in their practice and they care little for the resulting contradictions. To the orthodox, they sprout heresy at every pore. They do not draw on the traditional Sufi orders, but prefer to create their own organizations." [106] In this respect, an important aspect of the new urban groups is that Islam has become the vehicle for political demands and not the inspiration for those demands.

d. Conclusion

As a conclusion to the theory that Muslim revivalism is primarily a result of modernization, and more specifically, urbanization, four factors which will affect the success or failure of revivalist movements are presented:

1. If the existing elite is sufficiently strong and united and maintains control of a powerful coercive force it can successfully resist the attacks of the revivalists. Democratic political systems also seem to resist revivalism better than autocratic systems. A democratic system can more easily call in the silent majority in the countryside. Also, it obliges revivalism to compete with other ideologies and to expose its own contradictions to the test of political debate. A democratic system may find it easier to accommodate religious demands than an autocratic system, which fears to make accommodations lest concessions be taken as a sign of weakness.
2. The strength of the revivalists is influenced by the extent of Islamization in the traditional society: revivalism requires the existence of a tradition which can be revived. If no strong Islamic tradition has existed in the past, or if Islam has not been widely accepted then revivalism will be weakened and opposition may be created among those who are only partially Islamized. Revivalism's strength is also affected by its organization and leadership. If the revivalists can find leaders among the orthodox ulema, then revivalism may find it easier to win acceptance than if it is obliged to find leaders from outside the established elites.

3. The economic situation is also a significant factor. Economic deprivation alone seems inadequate as a basis for revolution but, a sudden downturn after prosperity may strongly affect those urban groups which form the revivalists' main recruiting grounds. These recruits are primarily working age men who have either lost their jobs or who cannot find jobs after migrating to the urban areas.
4. Finally, Islamic revivalism tends to draw its support from exactly the same new urban groups as the radical secular parties, socialist or nationalist. This may suggest a new type of revolutionary model which will grow relative to the degree of success Islamic movements attain.

In the final analysis contemporary Islamic revivalism may only be a means of mediation between old and new - a phenomenon which, "need not be resisted but simply observed." [107] However, The history of Islam has always been one of change and adaptation and, more recently, it has been a history of violent and revolutionary change. The Iranian episode is a clear indication that revivalism is a force to contend with and the new wave of violence in northern Nigeria may be setting the stage for more dramatic events to come.

Islam seems to provide an excellent medium for change in predominantly Islamic countries and Nigeria seems beset with all the problems which have spawned past revivalist movements to include, rural migration, high unemployment, class stratification, corruption, outside economic control, and a dissident internal faction building around a disgruntled student population and irate young men frustrated at the lack of opportunity for social and economic advancement. However, despite the riots which occurred in 1980 and 1982 Islam seems poorly equipped to provide an engine for significant change in Nigeria.

By tracing the rise of Islam in Nigeria, as was done in Chapter Three, we find that Islamic history has travelled through several stages. Beginning with its rise as an important social reform movement in the 19th century it gained control over large parts of west Africa. However, Islam began to wane as a political force during Nigeria's colonial occupation although it continued to grow as a religion. The spirit of the early reformists had died completely by the time of the second generation emirs.

Colonial policies fostered the decline of Islam, and as a political force it was only briefly active in 1954 when Nigerian Muslims pressed for and won a battle to establish the Muslim Court of Appeal, an institution unique in the Islamic world.

The establishment of the Muslim Court of Appeal was promulgated for two reasons. One, to determine the position of Maliki law in the future of Nigeria. Two, to insure that non-Muslim groups in northern Nigeria were not forced to live under the imposition of Islamic law after Nigeria gained independence.

Eventually, the Muslim Court of Appeal evolved into the Shari'a Court of Appeal, an institution whose existence wrought havoc in the Constitutional Conference drafting the 1979 Nigerian Constitution. However, the early period of its existence was hampered by two major obstacles. One, the high court relied upon a panel of assessors appointed independently of the panel of judges serving on the Muslim Court of Appeal and frequently, the panel of assessors and the judges found themselves at odds in their interpretation of Maliki Law. Two, there was no guarantee that a judgement correct by Muslim law would ever be upheld by the judicial system. Fears of Muslims that their laws would be destroyed by the "English" courts were rampant.

The institution of the Muslim Court of Appeal offered some evidence that Muslims in Nigeria were adaptive but correspondingly unwillingly to give up the tenets of their religion.

At independence, Islam had ceased to exist as a political force, although, in the northern portions of Nigeria being Muslim was usually a prerequisite for any type of political aspirations.

By 1980 Islam was practically forgotten as a potential mobilizing agent. However, the Iranian revolution and the ensuing Nigerian riots focused attention on a potentially volatile situation.

In fact, Islam in Nigeria is not revivalist but it may be providing an alternative revolutionary model for some segments of society. In that respect, on a very localized basis, it is a potentially violent engine for change. What Islam has become, in Nigeria, is a religion and not a way of life. It has lost the dynamism which infected the 19th century Jihadists and it has become, like Christianity, a facet of social and cultural obligation. Politically, it offers little more than a credential for potential office holders who seek election in predominantly Islamic states within Nigeria.

It is never wise to predict the course of future events, but in Nigeria, it seems safe to anticipate that Islam, while providing a potential mobilizing agent for localized reform does not possess the necessary strength, history, or commitment to challenge the structure of Nigeria's emerging national institutions.

E. ETHNICITY AND CHANGE

Many books have been written discussing the role of ethnicity in the development of Nigeria and Chapter Two of

this paper, while tracing the evolution of Nigeria's political history, also provides the history of the evolution of ethno-regional politics. It has become synonymous when discussing the rise of the Nigerian nation to also discuss the concurrent rise of ethnic politics.

My objective in these concluding remarks is to point out several factors which may be leading to the demise of ethnic politics in Nigeria, and because of that demise a corresponding change in Nigerian politics is being spawned.

The return of Ojukwu, as discussed in Chapter Four, represents a strong move towards eroding ethno-regional biases. Ojukwu's subsequent announcement on 14 January, 1983, that he was joining the NPN further served to foster, as he stated, "The coming together of two formerly antagonistic groups in the country." [108]

More significantly, the 1979 Constitution is a document which suppresses ethno-regionalism and reinforces the tenets of a strong central government. By law, it provides for a widely representative body of delegates to its political institutions, gives the president strong powers, and ensures that nationally elected officers have a representative vote from all Nigerians. It is a well constructed document written from the experience of many failures. Its success can be measured by the conduct of two national elections in four years and the endurance of its institutions based not on military power but on the veracity of its own construction.

As further evidence that ethnicity may be on the wane in Nigeria we have witnessed two national elections, one in 1979 and the other in 1983. At a national level the elections were marred by various protest concerning voter registration, the conduct of FEDECO, and the registration of political parties. However, the constitution has withstood the many protests and held in office those men elected by

the will of the majority. These two elections harbinger a changing reality in Nigeria. The course of change in future politics is beginning to ride on the strength of national parties, cross ethnic candidates, and integrated constituencies.

Of course, while national elections are slowly eroding the dynamics of ethno-regional politics, within states it is safe to bet that ethnicity is a key ingredient for successful candidacy. Hence, it is probably unlikely that any but an Ibo could be elected in the eastern portion of Nigeria, however, the current of change may be moving within states also, as a strong bid to create up to twenty-nine new states has been accepted in the national houses. [109] While the creation of these new states will present many problems within Nigerian politics they will certainly provide a wider range of ethnic participation at the national level. However, at the local and state level new states creation could be expected to create stronger ethnic political ties due to smaller state units based on ethnic homogeneity. Therefore, for example, while the Tiv represent a large minority vote in eastern Nigeria, by creating a new state they would dominate the central eastern section of Nigeria and consequently create an ethnically dominated state where none existed before.

In sum, while ethnicity continues to play a significant role in Nigerian politics several forces are at work to lessen its impact. It is these forces, the 1979 Constitution, the creation of new states and broad based political parties which hold the key to much of Nigeria's future change. The survival of democratic politics in Nigeria is providing an excellent medium for changing the political and social climate of that country.

C. ECONOMICS AND CHANGE

Chapter Five of this paper provided a fairly detailed outlook into Nigeria's economy, the problems of the national development plan, and Nigeria's plight as a victim of the oil syndrome. Nigeria's economic problem can be summed up rather quickly. Nigeria needs to diversify; in order to diversify she must have funds; to get funds she must pump oil to capacity. Therefore, when Nigeria can't pump oil to capacity (which it has not done since about 1977-1978) it can't get enough funds to diversify, and without diversification Nigeria remains a stagnant, monoculturally oil dependent economy, sensitive to the whims of a highly erratic world oil demand.

Nigeria's oil dependency has created many problems, as discussed in Chapter Five, however, paramount among these problems is the human tragedy; rapid urban migration, high unemployment, and corruption at all levels. With oil has come a rapid yet distinct class stratification and the world of the "haves" is all too far removed from the world of the "have nots." Relative deprivation both regionally and socially is in full swing in Nigeria.

Paramount among these many problems is the high unemployment created by rapid urban migration. Where once close to 90 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture now only about 50 percent of the population pursues that source of livelihood. Tragically, the largest portion of those who left the farms for greener pastures in the fast growing urban sprawls remain out of work. Concurrently, students graduating from universities are finding job placement next to impossible and within their ranks lie the potential leaders for extreme social change.

The management or mismanagement of the Nigerian national economy has become the root cause of the present political

tension in the country. Nigeria has failed to live within its available economic resources as it fails to produce while consuming the produce of more industrialized nations.

1983 was the crucial election year in Nigeria and the key election campaign issues were the economy and states creation. In dealing with the current economic mess the federal government with all of its resources must drastically restructure the economy and meaningfully diversify so that petroleum dependency can be substantially reduced.

In sum, the Nigerian economy cannot be a medium for change. By itself, it cannot generate social or political environments favorable to revitalization. However, the economy certainly provides the impetus for change as projects fail, unemployment soars, and corruption and inflation rise at equally rapid rates. The people will seek ways to institute change and the engine of that change may be the unemployed masses which now roam the streets of Nigeria's cities.

D. FINALLY

In total this paper has evaluated in some detail three potential mediums for change in Nigeria; Islam, ethnicity, and the economy. While Islam and ethnicity have each played a role in the dynamics of Nigeria's evolution it is the condition of the economy which may foster the growth of future unrest in Nigeria. However, on a national scale the conclusion is that the best hope for future development and constructive change lies in the framework of the 1979 Constitution and the leadership of the national political parties.

While Islam, ethnicity, and economics can spawn crises they cannot sustain lasting change. The future of social change is inherently bound up in a governmental system which

appears to be working and which must continue to find ways to assuage its massive population while gaining control of an economy whose fragility is marked by the rise and fall of the price for a barrel of oil.

NOTES

1. To implement this plan the US legislature would have to consider amending the law which prohibits aid to Nigeria by virtue of its membership in OPEC.
2. "Background Notes: Nigeria," United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division, Washington, D.C, August 1982. p.8.
3. Nelson, Harold D. (ed), Nigeria: A Country Study, Washington, D.C, HQ DA, 1982. p.192.
4. Baker, Pauline H, "Nigeria; Threat Perceptions and Strategic Responses," Paper presented at the Georgetown CSIS conference on "The Future of Conflict," November 23-24, 1981. p.5.
5. Ibid. p.5.
6. Bretton, Henry, Power and Stability in Nigeria, NY.NY, Praeger Pub, 1962. pp.31-32.
7. Crowder, Michael, A Short History of Nigeria, NY.NY, Praeger Pub, 1962. pp.195-196. "In fact, Lugard was not the inventor of the process of indirect rule, it had been applied previously in both India and Fiji."
8. The heroic explorations of Hugh Clapperton, Mungo Park and others, the conquest of malaria, and the formation of such giant trading corporations as the Royal Niger Company form an epic portion of both British and Nigerian history. However, the early achievements of British imperialist activity lie well beyond the scope of this paper.
9. Thought, largely, to have been formalized between 1885 and 1906.
10. Webster, J.B, and Boahen, A.A, History of West Africa, NY.NY, Praeger Pub, 1970. p.245.
11. Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria, p.205
12. Ibid. p.205.
13. Ibid. pp.205-206.
14. Ibid. p.206.
15. Ibid. p.212.

16. To be financed by the southern protectorate.
17. Hatch, John C, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, Chicago, Il, Henry Rognery Co, 1970. p.188. "Lugard's antagonism to the south was best illustrated in the reforms he proposed in its administration. He obviously believed that the nearer the south came to the practice of the north, the better it would be governed. For instance, he thought it would be possible to find and train chiefs who could be made into the feudal autocrats whom he had been accustomed to use in the north. He suggested that the region be divided into provinces, with district officers exercising judicial and executive powers, as was customary in the north. He believed that the spread of British forms of law, many of which were being gradually accepted in the south, should be halted, for the introduction of British Common Law indicated, Lugard thought, a step toward a modernized and Europeanized society."
18. Webster and Boahen, History of West Africa, p.247. Warrant chiefs were issued warrants by the British government to invest authority where none had existed before.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria, p.222.
22. Ibid. p.224.
23. Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, p.197.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. p.198.
26. Ibid. p.199.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. p.200.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. p.201.
31. Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria, p.239.
32. Ibid. p.242.
33. Ibid. pp.242-243.

34. The scope of Azikwe's political maneuvers is beyond the realm of this paper. A good account of his early efforts, to include, his failure to attend the Manchester Pan-African Conference, the Zikist Movement, and the failure of his London Delegation can be found in Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, pp.250-252.
35. Ibid. p.252.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. p.253.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. p.254.
40. A frequent source of postwar political initiatives.
41. Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, p.255.
42. Ibid. p.257.
43. Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria, p.253.
44. Ibid. p.254.
45. Ibid. p.256.
46. Ibid. p.258.
47. Ibid. p.265.
48. Ibid. p.266.
49. Whitaker, C.S. Jr, "Second Beginnings; The New political Framework," Issues, Ann Arbor, Michigan, African Studies Association, 1981. p.3.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. p.4.
52. Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria, p.279. Chief Festus.
53. Stremmlau, John J, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1977. p.38.

54. Ibid. p.39.
55. I recommend Stremlau's, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970.
56. Okoli, Eukora Joe, "After The Kano Rioting," West Africa Magazine, 12 Jan, 1981.
57. Ibid.
58. Baker, "Nigeria: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Responses," p.5.
59. Okoli, Eukora Joe, "More Religious Rioting in Nigeria," West Africa Magazine, 8 November, 1982.
60. "Messages From Maiduguri," West Africa Magazine, 8 November, 1982.
61. Mawure, Daniya, "Religious Fanaticism - Nigeria's New Baby," NAN, 12 November, 1982.
62. "Nigeria: Whose Mistake," African Confidential, Vol. 24, No.3, 2 February, 1983. p.1.
63. For a full treatment of the subject read, J.S. Trimingham's, A History of Islam in West Africa, London, England, Oxford Univ. Press, 1962.
64. 1) There is only one true God. 2) Pray five times daily, turning towards Mecca. 3) Give alms to the poor. 4) Fast in the month of Ramadan (the month in which the Quran was revealed to Mohammad). 5) Make the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj).
65. For other Muslims and religions of the book.
66. The Mahdi is the Hidden Imam on earth. Shi'ite's wait for his re-appearance to lead the re-emergence of Islam against the infidels. Islam has known many men who have claimed to be the Mahdi.
67. Crowder, Michael, West Africa: An Introduction to its History, London, England, Butler and Tanner Pub, LTD, 1977. pp.24-25.
68. Ibid. p.35. Three of these states were, Takrur, Wolof and Mossi.
69. Takrur was the only Islamic state in west Africa at the time.
70. Regained independence in 1153.

71. Crowder, West Africa, p.32.
72. Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa, pp.82-83.
73. Ibid. pp.126-127.
74. Ibid. p.130
75. Ibid. p132. An Example of this spread of Islam can be found in the following passage from the text of the Kano Chronicle, "During his reign Sharifs came to Kano consisting of 'Abd ar-Rahman and his followers. The story goes that the Prophet came to 'Abd ar-Rahman in a dream and said to him, 'Rise and go west and strengthen Islam'....(He was welcomed by Rimfa) and confirmed Islam in this town for he had brought with him many books. He advised Rimfa to build a Friday mosque. He cut down the (sacred) tree and built a minaret on its site. When he had reinforced Islam and the number of 'ulama had increased in the town and Islam had become universal over its territory 'Abd al-Karim returned to Egypt, leaving behind his deputy, Sidi Fari."
76. Crowder, West Africa p.47.
77. Ibid. p.49.
78. Ibid. p.71.
79. Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa, p.155.
80. Crowder, West Africa p.79.
81. Ibid. p.82.
82. Ibid. p.123.
83. Ibid. pp.125-126: The Dyula, to the south, were a non-Muslim people eventually conquered in a revolution by Samori Toure. By 1881, A large Muslim empire had emerged in this area.
84. Kritizeck, James and Lewis, William H, Islam in Africa, NY.NY, Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co, 1969, p.294.
85. Ibid
86. Ibid. p.295
87. Trimingham, J.S, The Influence of Islam Upon Africa (2nd ed), London, England, Longman Group, LTD, 1980. p.103.
88. Kritzeck and Lewis, Islam in Africa, p.110.

89. Eurns, Alan C. History of Nigeria, NY.NY, Barnes and Noble Inc, 1963. p.264.
90. Sadau, Imouru Dan, "Islam: After Iran, Nigeria?" Africa, January, 1983, pp. 19-23.
91. Ibid.
92. Clarke, Peter D, "Ideology for Change," West Africa Magazine, 23 August, 1982.
93. Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, p.269. Shell invested \$312 million in prospecting and related oil industries, which represented 85 percent of all new net foreign investment during the period and exceeded the total investment in Nigerian manufacturing.
94. Data for this chapter was obtained from the reference source, "Africa South of the Sahara, 1981-1982" and from a thesis by Phil Underwood entitled, "West African Oil."
95. Fischer, Michael M.J, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Univ. Press, 1980. p.189. In August 1977 Tehran slum dwellers rioted. Many count this as the beginning of the revolution.
96. Ibid. p.190.
97. Stempel, John, Inside the Iranian Revolution. Bloomington, IN, Indiana Univ. Press, 1981. p.311.
98. Yapp, M.E, "Contemporary Islamic Revivalism," Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, Vol XI, London, Eng, June 1980. p.178. Other examples have occurred in Afganistan and the Philippines.
99. West Africa was an area of violent rejection of Western intrusion. There, the French were opposed by Al Hajj 'Umar, a west African jihadist leader of a particular Sufi order.
00. Yapp, "Revivalism," p.183. Elites consisted of traditional, military or political governing elites, and intellectual, religious or tribal elites, as well as modern intellectual elites.
01. Ibid.
02. Ibid.
03. Ibid.
04. Ibid. p.184.

05. Ibid. pp.184-185.
06. Ibid. pp.186-187.
07. Ibid. p.195.
08. Africa Research Bulletin, Exter, England, Africa Research LTD, Vol.20, No.1, 15 February, 1983. p.6703.
09. Ibid.

APPENDIX A

The 1979 Constitution was brought into force by the FMG as an ordinary decree, entitled the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree 1978, No.25, taking effect on 1 October, 1979. In a departure from the British antecedents, the new law adopted features of the United States Constitution - The establishment of a governmental system predicated on a popularly elected president at the head of a strong executive branch and a separate bicameral legislature.

In addition to granting numerous personal freedoms and the recognition that sovereignty resides in the people the constitution also continues the practice of distributing powers between federal and state authorities by means of a list enumerating where the federal government is to have sole competence and a concurrent list of subjects on which both the federal and state authorities may legislate (federal law prevails over state law in the event of inconsistency). Power over unlisted matters is retained by the states. In conformity with a longterm tendency to aggregate powers at the federal level, the exclusive list contains sixty-six items compared to forty-four under the 1963 constitution. Control over the census, arms, and prisons are among those matters shifted to the national level. The federal government also retains exclusive power over defense, immigration, external affairs, banking and currency, regulation of trade, price controls, agricultural marketing, labor and trade unions, police, and the control of political parties.

Areas on the concurrent list in which states may legislate (subject to federal predominance in case of conflict) are the allocation of revenues, collection of taxes, electric power, and industrial and agricultural development. Primary education is the responsibility of the states and local governments.

An important distinction is that under the new Constitution the federal government sets the rate and collects state taxes, which are then remitted to the states. Other revenues collected by the federal government, notably the substantial mineral royalties, mining rents, and direct profits of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), go into a single Federation Account, to be distributed among federal, state, and local governments on a pro rata basis, as determined by periodic enactments of the National Assembly. The vesting of these powers in the National Assembly enhances the authority of the federal government, which extends to the assignment of certain revenues directly to local councils without consulting state authorities.

Under the Nigerian system the states do not have individual constitutions; rather their structures are delineated within the national Constitution. State governments are based on an executive model closely conforming to that of the federal government. Executive authority is vested in a governor while legislative power is bestowed on a single-house legislature. The states have responsibility for establishing local government authorities, subject to the stipulations in the constitution as to how local governments are to be organized and the functions that are to be conferred on them. The Constitution outlines special procedures for legislation creating new states, which must be preceded by a request supported by two-thirds of the members of the Senate and House representing the area, the state assembly, and local councils of the area, followed by a

referendum of the people in the area and approval by the Senate and House by a two-thirds majority.

The Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds majority of all members of both houses of the national legislature, in addition to approval by resolution of the legislative bodies of two-thirds of the states. The fundamental rights chapter together with the legislative process for creating new states form a special category that can only be amended by four-fifths majority of all members of the national legislature plus approval by two-thirds of the state bodies.

While the Nigerian political framework bears a marked resemblance to the federal system of the United States, the institutions the republic has adopted carry the imprint of its own unique experiences and needs. The president is intentionally delegated strong executive powers. Special conditions attached to his election are intended to insure that he will be more than a regional candidate, while his cabinet must, by constitutional direction, include ministers representing all nineteen states.

In spite of his wide authority the president cannot govern effectively without collaboration of the directly elected Senate and House of Representatives of the National Assembly, which must approve his legislative program and budget. The task was not made easier in the post 1979 government by the fact that five parties were represented in the two legislative bodies, while the governing National Party of Nigeria (NPN) did not command a majority in either house. A system of standing and conference committees has evolved, following the American pattern, before which ministers and officials can be called upon to appear.

The Constitution provides for an intricate allocation of powers between the nineteen state governments and the federal government that overlap in several sensitive areas. The issue of state authority versus federal government

control has accordingly been the source of much political skirmishing since the new state governments, only seven of which were wholly in the hands of Shagari's NPN, were installed in October 1979. A key element of federal-state relations, the allocation of revenues, including the surging oil income, was left by the constitutional authors to be decided by the National Assembly. The formula adopted, assigning less than a third to the states and an additional 10 percent to local government, has been bitterly contested by most state governors. Nonetheless, the state shares are by far the largest source of state incomes.

Within the Federal Government, the Constitution sets forth, in detail, respective roles of the separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Still, many practical problems emerged as the executive branch and the legislature sought to accustom themselves to interacting within an unfamiliar structure with few precedents to fall back on. Added complications were the presence of five parties in the National Assembly and the lack of a majority by Shagari's NPN, necessitating a working alliance with the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) that did not function smoothly. It is, therefore, somewhat of an accomplishment that the basic legislative program cleared the National Assembly in 1980 with serious delays only over budget appropriations.

1. The Executive Branch: The president and vice president, whose names appear on the same electoral ballot, are directly elected by the people. The President serves as head of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. His term is four years, and he may be elected for a second but not a third term. It was intended by the Constitution that the president would exercise strong direction over the federal government with his powers

bounded by a system of checks and balances provided by an independent legislature and judiciary. Nevertheless, a considerable measure of cooperation and restraint was foreseen as indispensable particularly during the early stages of introducing a form of government new to Nigeria. In a summit meeting of the heads of the five parties called by Shagari in January 1980, agreement was reached on the need for such cooperation and for a continuing dialogue among party leaders. Interparty relations remained good, although meetings at the top party level were not regularized, owing partly to the animosity of Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) toward Shagari and his persistent unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of Shagari's election, based on what Awolowo considered unfair election results in 1979.

The size of the president's executive council (cabinet) is not prescribed in the Constitution, nor are the ministries designated. The president is, however, required to name an attorney general and to name at least one citizen of each of the nineteen states to his cabinet. The first cabinet of the 1979 government had twenty-four ministers, of whom nineteen were from the President's NPN, while five were from the cooperating NPP. Cabinet ministers may not be members of the National Assembly but are obliged to attend sessions of either house if invited to do so when matters pertinent to their ministries are discussed. Ministers have also appeared before committees along with the director of the budget to explain and defend appropriations for their departments. In spite of the presence of several influential political figures, the cabinet leaned toward technocratic appointees, and at the same time reflected the need not only to include members from each of the nineteen states but also to provide some ethnic balancing.

The executive branch incorporates inputs from nine other federal bodies, some exercising powers independent of the president and some whose functions are only advisory. The most senior of these is the Council of State composed of the president and vice president, former presidents, the president of the Senate and speaker of the House, state governors, and members appointed by state councils of chiefs. The Council of State advises the president on such matters as the census, the award of national honors, appointments to other executive bodies, and the maintenance of public order. The Council of State is the only public body at the national level where the traditional rulers-emirs, obas, and onis (kings) - are represented. Although it met only three times in the new government's first year, the Council had symbolic importance as the linking element between the still influential traditional leadership and the national government.

The Federal Civil Service Commission and the Police Service Commission have powers of appointment to these services, while the Judicial Service Commission advises the president on senior appointments to the bench. The president is chairman of the National Defense Council and the National Security Council, concerned with external defense and public security, respectively. The vice president chairs the National Economic Council, which includes the state governors as members and functions as the coordinating body for economic planning at the different levels of government. The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), an independent body with a member from each state, organizes elections, registers voters, and registers and supervises political parties. The National Population Commission, also with one member from each state, is responsible for the census, birth and death registration, and advising the president on Sub-Saharan Africa's largest population. While the president has power to appoint members of these bodies (except those who are

designated in the Constitution on the basis of official positions they hold), the appointments must be confirmed by the Senate. The appointees are somewhat insulated from political pressures by the fact that they hold office for five-year terms and can be removed by the president only with support of two-thirds of the Senate.

The Constitution also permits the president to appoint special advisors with no restriction as to numbers. Shagari has named nine of these special assistants. Some are personal confidants of Shagari, while others have been chosen for their professional qualifications or to provide ethnic balance.

Permanent secretaries-senior civil servants usually entrusted with day-to-day operating responsibilities for government ministries-play a vital role in the administration of the executive branch. Shagari has reappointed the twenty-three permanent secretaries of the military government, while reshuffling their responsibilities, and added eight more.

Early in his term Shagari created another category within the executive branch by naming presidential liaison officers to each of the eighteen states outside of Lagos, purportedly to oversee federal projects in the states and act as the federal government's link with the state governors. These posts, not mentioned in the Constitution, were distributed to NPN politicians. Shagari's action was bitterly criticized by the opposition parties and was not supported by the cooperating NPP on the grounds that the president was seeking to circumvent the authority of state governments in order to reward NPN party workers with lucrative posts. The opposition governors have boycotted the liaison officers, reducing their effectiveness in states where the NPN has not been the governing party.

2. The Legislature: Responsibility for legislative action rests with the National Assembly, consisting of a Senate with five members from each state for a total of ninety-five, and a House of Representatives with 449 members (One additional seat is reserved for the future capital of Abuja). Each of the nineteen states is divided into five senatorial districts, as well as a larger number of House districts, each with roughly 100,000 registered voters. The largest House delegation (46 seats) is from Kano state, and the smallest (10 seats) is from Niger state. The assembly sits for four years, after which elections for both houses are held on dates set by FEDECO.

The two bodies elect their own leaders. Under the agreement worked out by the NFN-NPP majority coalition, the offices of president of the Senate and deputy speaker of the House were reserved for the NPN; those of speaker of the House and deputy president of the Senate were offered to the NPP. The assembly is required to remain in session for at least 181 days each year.

Either house of the assembly may originate a bill. Proposed legislation is subject to review by one of the standing committees in each house. Although only one of these-the Joint Committee on Finance- is stipulated in the Constitution, twenty-seven committees have been established in the House and twenty-two in the Senate. Twenty-five members are assigned to each House committee and eleven to each Senate committee. Lacking regular meeting places, staffs, and other resources, most of the committees have yet to play a major part in the legislative process. Enactment of a bill requires approval of both houses plus assent of the president. The president has thirty days in which to signify his approval. If the president fails to approve a bill within this period, the bill may still be passed if it

gains a two-thirds majority of both houses. Special procedures apply for appropriation bills if, after two months into a financial year, one house has failed to act favorably. The Joint Committee on Finance is then called upon to resolve differences. If this step fails, the bill can still be approved by an affirmative vote in a special joint sitting of the National Assembly.

3. The Judiciary: The Nigerian judicial system has retained many British legal practices and forms. Laws enacted in Nigeria before independence at the regional or national level continued to be in force after 1960, as did the relatively few laws extending to overseas territories. The few British statutes that extended to Nigeria and remained in force after independence have, in almost all cases, been repealed or suspended by Nigerian law. During the military regimes from 1966 to 1979, federal laws were made in the form of decrees while those at the state level were in the form of edicts. Another source of the law applied by Nigerian courts is English common law, which has been modified by the courts to fit local circumstances. A distinct Nigerian case law, departing entirely from the English precedent, covered only a narrow range of matters by the end of the second decade of independence. The unwritten body of customs and traditions regulating relationships within communities in their traditional settings, known as customary law, is recognized in many states and is observed by the courts if not repugnant to natural justice or incompatible with written law. Customary law may be recognized for civil matters, such as matrimonial, land, and property disputes.

Nigeria has a multi-tiered judicial system. Customary and area courts are at the lowest levels, magistrates's

courts and high courts function at the state level, and all are surmounted by three tiers of federal courts. A distinctive feature is the parallel sharia court system found in northern states for adjudicating matters of Muslim personal law. Under the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers prescribed by the 1979 Constitution, the Supreme Court of Nigeria is autonomous and has in practice played a substantial role in interpreting the 1979 Constitution's application over the authority of the executive and legislative branches as well as in federal-state relations.

At the federal level the lowest of the three echelons is the Federal High Court, which is designated to deal with revenue matters and other cases of original jurisdiction as determined by the National Assembly. This court superseded the federal revenue court of previous governments. The Federal Court of Appeal is at an intermediate level between the state high courts and the Supreme Court. It hears appeals from the Federal High Court and from state high courts. A bitter controversy in the Constituent Assembly over the establishment of a separate Sharia Court of Appeal on a level with the Supreme Court was settled by stipulating that, among the fifteen or more justices plus the chief justice of the Federal Court of Appeal, no fewer than three must be learned in Islamic personal law and three learned in customary law. Appeals from state sharia courts of appeal are heard by the Federal Court of Appeal which for this purpose is duly constituted if it consists of these three judges.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in constitutional disputes between the federation and states or between states, in addition to other matters that the National Assembly may assign to it. It takes appeals from the Federal Court of Appeal on interpretations of the Constitution on

civil or criminal matters, on validity of elections and membership in legislatures, and on death sentences pronounced or confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal.

In addition to the chief justice, the Supreme Court may consist of up to fifteen members. The court sits in panels, being duly constituted with five judges for original hearings and seven when hearing appeals by states. Federal judges are appointed by the president on advice of the Federal Judicial Services Commission. Supreme Court justices and the chief justice of the Appeal Court are subject to Senate confirmation. Independence of the judiciary is intended to be safeguarded by prohibitions against removal except on grounds of incapacity or misbehavior supported by a two-thirds vote of the Senate.

After the return to civilian rule the higher courts were almost immediately confronted with numerous demands for interpretation of the 1979 Constitution on heated issues of interparty and federal state relations. Decisions by the courts on these and other major civil rights and constitutional cases have brought credit to the higher bench for integrity and independence.

The governmental structure at state level closely resembles that established at the national level under the Constitution. The three branches of government are represented and separately organized. The executive branch is headed by a governor elected to a four year term on the same ticket with a deputy governor. To insure a measure of support throughout the state's area, a winning candidate must obtain the largest number of votes and also secure one-fourth of the votes in at least two-thirds of the local government districts, or a run-off is required.

Unlike the two houses of the National Assembly, each state has a unicameral legislature called the House of Assembly under the chairmanship of a speaker elected by the

assembly. As with the National Assembly, the state House is constitutionally obligated to be in attendance 181 days each year. A governor's veto of legislation may be overruled by a two-thirds vote of the assembly. The FEDECO determines the boundaries of the state constituencies. Under the Constitution there must be three times as many seats in the state legislature as the number of seats allotted to the state in the federal House of Representatives.

The governor's cabinet, or executive council of the state, consists of the heads of state departments, known as commissioners. They may not simultaneously be members of the House of Assembly although their appointments are subject to confirmation by that body. Several of the nine federal executive bodies established by the Constitution have counterparts in mandatory bodies at the state level, to include the State Council of Chiefs, Civil Service Commission, Judicial Service Commission, and the Electoral Commission.

The range of authority of state governments is outlined in schedules appended to the 1979 Constitution detailing the areas in which the federal government has exclusive power to legislate and the areas in which federal and state governments have concurrent powers. In spite of the conscientious effort by the authors of the Constitution to demarcate the respective powers of the federal and state authorities, acute differences emerged during the early period of the second republic, raising fears that state resentment over perceived federal intrusion would remain a continuing source of contention. Some of these issues have been resolved by concessions on the part of the Shagari government.

Revenue is a key issue. During the early years of independence the states secured their revenues chiefly from export duties and excise taxes, notably those on tobacco and petroleum products. Disparities in this system became pronounced during the 1973-1974 OPEC oil price increase and

a more equitable means of distribution had to be devised. In 1975 the Distributable Pool Account was established to assign revenues from import and export duties to the states. Under the 1979 Constitution the Distributable Pool Account was superseded by the more comprehensive Federation Account into which all but some minor revenues were to be accumulated. The ultimate allocation among federal, state, and local authorities was left to the National Assembly.

After months of heated debate a revenue allocation law was approved in February 1981 assigning 58.5 percent of the revenues in the Federation Account to the federal government, 26.5 percent to the nineteen states, 5 percent to the mineral producing states, and 10 percent to local governments. While states receive the proceeds from personal income and some other taxes, their share of distribution from the Federation Account is by far the most important source of state revenue.

The systematic reorganization of local government was an integral part of the five-stage return to civilian rule announced in October 1975. Local administration had a disappointing record since first efforts to introduce popular participation in the East and West regions a decade before independence. In the North the colonial system of indigineous authorities of emirs and chiefs patterned on the traditional power structure had been extended through the first republic. Under the military regime the authority of the military leadership was transmitted to the local level through the assignment of resident or district officers to supervise the activities of local councils.

The reorganization of 1976 introduced a uniform single-tier council structure among all nineteen states. It was aimed at bringing experience in self-government to the local level, especially in the emirate dominated north. The newly elected local councils were also called upon by the military

leadership to select delegates to the 1977 Constituent Assembly preparatory to the return to civilian rule.

The reforms introduced by the military authorities in 1976 required that the single-tiered local councils be elected directly or indirectly (nine adopted direct elections and ten, indirect). The councils elect their own chairmen and make decisions by majority vote. The military regime granted increasingly large sums of money to the new local councils and was determined to install a system that would avoid the corrupt practices and inefficiency of earlier local government models.

The 1979 Constitution lists the local administrative areas of each of the nineteen states and requires every state to provide for democratically elected local government councils by enacting laws governing finance, composition, structure, and functions. The Constitution also mandates the participation of local councils in economic development through membership in an economic planning board.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No. Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2.	Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	2
3.	Chairman, Code 56Bc Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1
4.	Center for Naval Analyses 2000 North Beauregard Street P.O. Box 11280 Alexandria, Virginia 22311	1
5.	Professor Michael Clough, Code 56Cg Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1

208373

Thesis

G436 Gilkes

c.1 Change in Nigeria:
challenge of the 80's.

208373

Thesis

G436 Gilkes

c.1 Change in Nigeria:
challenge of the 80's.



thesG436

Change in Nigeria :



3 2768 001 01037 4

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY